This paper explores the systemic problems that plague provision-dependent investment protection reforms in CETA, TTIP, and other recent EU-FTAs. The authors suggest that the current international investment system’s asymmetrical structure precludes effective reforms because reforms that “level the playing field” between state and investor run counter to the logic of a system designed with the purpose of protecting investors and investments, not states. The authors suggest that a new symmetrical international investment dispute settlement structure may provide a more convincing answer to calls for reform. After beginning with a background on the necessity of and problems with “vagueness” in law (both generally and in the international investment system), the chapter analyzes the most prominent reforms and reform proposals in the current international investment landscape. The chapter elucidates several of the structural problems that plague these current reform proposals and demonstrates that a symmetrical approach could alleviate these problems.
Monday, January 2, 2017
Tietje & Lang: The Reform of Investment Protection Rules in CETA, TTIP and Other Recent EU-FTAs: Convincing?
Christian Tietje (Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg - Law) & Andrej Lang (Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg - Law) have posted The Reform of Investment Protection Rules in CETA, TTIP and Other Recent EU-FTAs: Convincing? Here's the abstract: