Presenting a thorough examination of intelligence activities in international law, Sophie Duroy provides theoretical and empirical justifications to support the cutting-edge claim that states’ compliance with international law in intelligence matters serves their national security interests. This book theorises the regulation of intelligence activities under international law, identifying three layers of regulation: a clear legal framework governing intelligence activities (legality); a capacity to enforce state responsibility (accountability); and the integration of legality and accountability into responsive regulation by the international legal order (compliance).
Tuesday, May 23, 2023
Duroy: The Regulation of Intelligence Activities under International Law
Tuesday, May 16, 2023
Milanovic: The International Law of Intelligence Sharing During Military Operations
Intelligence sharing is indispensable to modern coalition warfare, but also in numerous other contexts, e.g., peacetime counterterrorism. An excellent recent example demonstrating the importance of intelligence sharing to contemporary conflicts is the massive provision of intelligence by Western allies to Ukraine, to help in its resistance against the Russian invasion, but there are many others. This chapter examines the following international legal issues raised by intelligence sharing during military operations. First, whether the sharing of intelligence by a State with another State or non-State actor engaged in an armed conflict with a third party can make the sharing State a party to the armed conflict. Second, when intelligence sharing can be internationally wrongful on the basis of rules that may prohibit the sharing of intelligence as such, including the prohibition on the use of force, the principle of non-intervention, the requirements of neutrality, and international human rights law. Finally, State responsibility for complicity, whereby the sharing of intelligence becomes internationally wrongful because it facilitates the wrongful conduct of a third party.
Monday, September 27, 2021
Milanovic: Intelligence Sharing in Multinational Military Operations and Complicity under International Law
This article examines the international legal framework applicable to intelligence sharing in multinational military operations, with a particular focus on complicity scenarios. It first provides a theoretical overview of the role of fault in complicity, of how intent and knowledge can be conceptualized, and of the attribution of fault to States. It then looks in detail at the rule codified in Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, and argues that this rule is best understood as employing multiple modes of fault (direct and indirect intent and wilful blindness). The article also argues that international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) possess their own complicity rules. These regime-specific rules can apply to State assistance to non-state actors and can employ more relaxed modes of fault than Article 16. A State could thus be responsible for facilitating the commission of serious violations of IHL and IHRL through the sharing of intelligence or the provision of other aid if it consciously disregarded a risk that its partner would commit such violations with the aid provided. The article then looks at the role that mitigation measures employed by the assisting State, such as diplomatic assurances, have in assessing its responsibility for complicity, and at whether risks generated by the provision of assistance can lawfully be balanced against the risks generated by suspending assistance. Finally, the article examines two basic scenarios – that of sharing intelligence that facilitates a partner’s wrongful act, and that of receiving unlawfully obtained or shared intelligence.
Saturday, September 18, 2021
Moulin: Le cyber espionnage en droit international
Faut-il, dès lors, considérer que « tout ce qui n’est pas interdit est permis », y compris en matière de cyber-espionnage ? Il convient de répondre par la négative, et souligner que le cyber-espionnage est sujet à un évitement normatif. Il n’est, en effet, ni interdit ni permis. D’une part, il n’est pas « interdit », car la commission de tels actes ne saurait constituer un fait internationalement illicite. D’autre part, il n’est pas « permis », « autorisé » ou ne constitue pas un « droit », car les Etats peuvent tout à fait prendre des mesures pour empêcher d’autres Etats d’exercer des activités de cyber-espionnage à leur encontre. D’un côté, les Etats souhaitent profiter de cette absence de règlementation internationale et ne sont pas favorables à une prohibition expresse de l’espionnage. D’un autre côté, ils ne souhaitent pas pour autant consacrer un « droit » à l’espionnage, dans la mesure où l’activité peut aller à l’encontre de leurs intérêts. C’est bien le cas en matière de cyber-espionnage, et ce phénomène d’évitement normatif se manifeste tant à l’égard des règles connectées à l’intégrité territoriale (Première partie), dont l’application est nécessairement perturbée par les caractéristiques uniques du cyber-espace, qu’à l’égard des règles déconnectées de l’intégrité territoriale (Deuxième partie).
Saturday, February 23, 2019
Lubin: The Liberty to Spy
Many, if not most, international legal scholars share the ominous contention that espionage, as a legal field, is devoid of meaning. For them, any attempt to extrapolate the lex lata corpus of the International Law of Intelligence (ILI), let alone its lex scripta, would inevitably prove to be a failed attempt, as there is simply nothing to extrapolate. The notion that international law is moot as to the question of if, when, and how intelligence is to be collected, analyzed, and promulgated, has been repeated so many times that it has attained the status of a dogma.
This paper offers a new and innovative legal framework for articulating the law and practice of interstate peacetime espionage operations, relying on a body of moral philosophy and intelligence ethics thus far ignored by legal thinkers. This framework adopts a diagnosis of the legality of covert intelligence, at three distinct temporal stages – before, during, and after. In doing so it follows the traditional paradigms of international law and the use of force, which themselves are grounded in the rich history of Just War Theory. Adopting the Jus Ad, Jus In, Jus Post model makes for an appropriate choice, given the unique symbiosis that exists between espionage and fundamental U.N. Charter principles.
This paper, focuses on the first of these three paradigms, the Jus Ad Explorationem (JAE), a sovereign’s prerogative to engage in peacetime espionage and the right’s core limitations. Examining a plethora of international legal sources the paper exemplifies the myriad ways by which peacetime intelligence gathering has been already recognized as a necessary pre-requisite for the functioning of our global legal order. The paper then proceeds to discuss the nature of the JAE. It argues that that the right to spy is best understood as a privilege in Hohfeldian terms. It shows how understanding interstate intelligence operations as a weaker “liberty-right” that imposes no obligations on third parties to tolerate such behavior, helps capture the essence of the customary norms that form part of the practice.
Recognizing the liberty right to spy opens the door for the doctrine of “abuse of rights” to play a role in constraining the practice. By identifying two sole justifications for peacetime espionage – advancing the national security interests of States and promoting an increase in international stability and cooperation – we are able to delimit what may constitute abusive spying (exploiting one’s right to spy not for the purposes for which it was intended). The paper thus concludes by introducing five categories of unlawful espionage: (1) spying as a means to advance personal interests; (2) spying as a means to commit internationally wrongful acts; (3) spying as a means to advance corporate interests; (4) spying as a means to facilitate a dictatorship; and (5) spying as a means to exploit post-colonial relationship.
Monday, November 6, 2017
Carnegie & Carson: The Disclosure Dilemma: Nuclear Intelligence and International Organizations
Scholars have long argued that international institutions solve information problems through increased transparency. This article introduces a distinct problem that instead requires such institutions keep information secret. We argue that states often seek to reveal intelligence about other states’ violations of international rules and laws but are deterred by concerns about revealing the sources and methods used to collect it. Properly equipped international institutions, however, can mitigate these dilemmas by analyzing and acting on sensitive information while protecting it from wide disclosure. Using new data on intelligence sharing with the International Atomic Energy Agency and analyses of the full universe of nuclear proliferation cases, we demonstrate that reforms that strengthened the Agency’s intelligence safeguarding capabilities led to greater intelligence-sharing and fewer nuclear-related transgressions. However, our theory suggests that solving these dilemmas provides informed states with a subtle form of influence that creates tension with the normative goal of international transparency.
Tuesday, October 3, 2017
Bignami & Resta: Human Rights Extraterritoriality: The Right to Privacy and National Security Surveillance
This chapter focuses on the international right to privacy and national security surveillance by spy agencies. It assesses the extent to which the law of the United States and Europe (EU and ECtHR) afford extraterritorial protection for the right to privacy, in furtherance of the international human right to privacy. The chapter concludes that U.S. law draws a stark line between insiders (U.S. citizens and permanent residents) and outsiders, and affords significantly more protection for insiders. On the European side, even though the EU does not have jurisdiction internally over spy agencies, it does have the power to regulate foreign access to EU personal data. The four EU-U.S. agreements in place that govern the U.S. intelligence community’s use of EU personal data follow the logic of bilateralism, and protect only personal data originating in the EU and, in some cases, only EU persons. As for the ECtHR, which has jurisdiction internally over European spy agencies, its jurisprudence on extraterritoriality strongly suggests that, once squarely confronted with the issue, the ECtHR will find that European spy agencies have a duty to respect privacy rights whenever they exercise control over personal data.
Friday, April 29, 2016
Deeks: Confronting and Adapting: Intelligence Agencies and International Law
Intelligence activity is — or, more accurately, was — the last bastion of foreign relations unconstrained by international law. States could steal diplomatic secrets, covertly assess rivals’ military capabilities, and disseminate propaganda inside other states without fear of international legal sanction. This absence of regulation made sense as long as a state’s intelligence activities were primarily directed at foreign states and their officials. However, intelligence activity now implicates private actors as never before, as states engage in bulk data collection, steal secrets from corporations, and expand their focus on non-state actors such as terrorist groups. As a result, some states and advocates now are pressing for a formalist approach to international law, claiming that states should interpret various bodies of existing international law as applicable to state intelligence activities. Others contend that intelligence activities will and should remain untouched by international legal constraint. Both approaches are flawed: the realpolitik view of the (non-existent) relationship between intelligence and international legal constraints is unsustainable and creates troubling legal black holes. The formalist view fails to acknowledge important reasons why state-on-state intelligence activities are distinct from diplomatic and military actions that states view as constrained by international law.
This Article identifies a better way to mediate the relationship between intelligence and international law. Rather than rejecting international law altogether or, alternatively, imposing a rigid legal framework on intelligence activity, it argues that states should differentiate between international laws that protect individuals against tangible harm (such as international humanitarian law and human rights treaties) and those that protect states against harms that are often dignitary (such as respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity). The Article proposes a sliding interpretive scale whereby states engaged in intelligence activity have less freedom to interpret and apply individually-focused international rules and more freedom to interpret state-protective rules. It also illustrates how several states have begun to pursue this approach in practice. Ultimately, this Article argues that states and human rights advocates both must adapt — in different ways — their expectations about the proper role of international law in the world of intelligence operations.
Friday, December 11, 2015
Deeks: Intelligence Communities and International Law: A Comparative Approach
How must states’ intelligence communities (ICs) approach their international law obligations? From the perspective of international law itself, the answer is fairly clear: ICs must comply with those international obligations that their states assume. Yet intelligence activities – recruiting foreign assets, conducting electronic surveillance on foreign leaders, and undertaking covert actions to influence political and economic conditions abroad – look very different from traditional statecraft and often appear, at least at first glance, to be in tension with international law constraints. Most states neither proclaim the legality nor concede the illegality of their intelligence activities under international law, seeming to prefer the ambiguity of the status quo.
This lack of certainty about the precise status of various intelligence activities in international law fosters conditions under which states can choose – and have chosen – different paths through the thicket. This chapter compares how certain states’ ICs approach their international law obligations. The United Kingdom asserts that its IC’s activities comply with international law. The United States is far more circumspect about whether its IC uniformly complies with international law. The United States even acknowledges that its domestic law authorizes some violations of international law, but employs various compensatory techniques to minimize overt international law violations.
Tuesday, September 9, 2014
Deeks: An International Legal Framework for Surveillance
Edward Snowden’s leaks laid bare the scope and breadth of the electronic surveillance that the U.S. National Security Agency and its foreign counterparts conduct. Suddenly, foreign surveillance is understood as personal and pervasive, capturing the communications not only of foreign leaders but also of private citizens. Yet to the chagrin of many state leaders, academics, and foreign citizens, international law has had little to say about foreign surveillance. Until recently, no court, treaty body, or government had suggested that international law, including basic privacy protections in human rights treaties, applied to purely foreign intelligence collection. This is now changing: several U.N. bodies, judicial tribunals, U.S. corporations, and victims of foreign surveillance are pressuring states to bring that surveillance under tighter legal control.
This article tackles three key, interrelated puzzles associated with this sudden transformation. First, it explores why international law has had so little to say about how, when, and where governments may spy on other states’ nationals. Second, it draws on international relations theory to argue that the development of new international norms regarding surveillance is both likely and essential. Third, it identifies six process-driven norms that states can and should adopt to ensure meaningful privacy restrictions on international surveillance without unduly harming their legitimate national security interests. These norms, which include limits on the use of collected data, periodic reviews of surveillance authorizations, and active oversight by neutral bodies, will increase the transparency, accountability, and legitimacy of foreign surveillance.
This procedural approach challenges the limited emerging scholarship on surveillance, which urges states to apply existing — but vague and contested — substantive human rights norms to complicated, clandestine practices. In identifying and valuing new, objectively verifiable, neutral norms, the article offers a more viable and timely solution to the perils of foreign surveillance.
Sunday, November 3, 2013
Talmon: Das Abhören des Kanzlerhandys und das Völkerrecht
Die deutsche Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel ist empört darüber, dass der amerikanische Geheimdienst NSA angeblich ihr persönliches Handy überwacht hat. Dieser kurze Beitrag untersucht, ob die Vereinigten Staaten durch das Abhören des Handys der Kanzlerin Regeln des Völkerrechts verletzt haben. Der Beitrag stellt fest, dass das Abhören der Handys ausländischer Regierungschefs den Tatbestand der Spionage in Friedenszeiten erfüllt und somit grundsätzlich völkerrechtlich zulässig ist, solange die Abhöraktion nicht vom Gelände einer Botschaft oder von einer ausländischen Militärbasis im Gebiet des betroffenen Staates aus erfolgt. Der Beitrag legt nahe, dass der Abschluss von so genannten "No Spy-Abkommen" weder praktisch durchführbar noch politisch sinnvoll ist und rät vom Abschluss solcher Abkommen auch unter "Freunden" ab.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel has been outraged over allegations that the NSA monitored her personal cell phone. This brief paper examines whether the United States violated any rules of public international law when tapping the Chancellor's cell phone. It concludes that tapping a foreign leader's cell phone constitutes an act of espionage in peacetime and as such is generally lawful under international law unless conducted from embassy premises or military bases in the territory of the foreign leader's State. The paper questions whether the conclusion of so-called "no spy agreements" is either practical or expedient and cautions against the conclusion of such agreements even among "friends".
Note: Downloadable document is in German.
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
Cooke: Bringing the Spies in from the Cold: Legal Cosmopolitanism and Intelligence under the Laws of War
Recently, as never before, intelligence operations have come under international humanitarian law. The Supreme Court has handed down the Hamdan and Boumediene decisions; President Obama has required the CIA and other interrogators to abide by Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 standards for all interrogations; district courts have declared stringent law of war criteria for overseas detentions; the Executive has applied the laws of war to terrorist targeting; and the private groups which have initiated this litigation, and pressed for these changes, continue to work for even more reform. This paper addresses the roots and effects of such changes. It begins by defining its key term - legal cosmopolitanism - with reference to a wide variety of legal materials, from Eric Posner, the European Court of Human Rights, and others. The paper attempts to illuminate that term’s core parts: a belief in an expanded United States demos, and preference for judicial over political power. The paper then continues with a survey of intelligence law. It illuminates the assumptions of a limited demos and unfettered executive that have until recently underlay intelligence law domestically, and goes on to establish that, in the long history of intelligence, no international law standard has heretofore been successfully applied to these operations. Thus legal cosmopolitanism and intelligence seem opposed, one attempting to expand the demos, with the other depending to some extent on limiting the demos. Nevertheless, recent executive and judicial actions affecting intelligence law have displayed strong and recognizable cosmopolitan underpinnings. The aforementioned executive orders, district court decisions, and policy positions reinforce this point, as a thorough survey of them reveals. Moreover, the history of similar legal initiatives in the uniformed military and elsewhere indicates that United States intelligence agencies will likely instantiate changes beyond even what the executive and courts require. Finally, the paper will conclude by suggesting that we view these changes - and the legal revolution they promise - skeptically. Intelligence has always operated apart from the law. If we bring intelligence operations within the law, they may no longer be able to protect us from what lurks without.
Friday, May 22, 2009
Chesterman: Intelligence Cooperation in International Operations
The prospect of the United Nations or any other international organisation developing an independent intelligence collection capacity is remote. This is due to the understandable wariness on the part of states about authorising a body to spy on them, though the United Nations itself has been reluctant to assume functions that might undermine its actual or perceived impartiality. At the same time, however, this position reflects a larger anomaly in the status of intelligence under international law as an activity commonly denounced but almost universally practised: empowering an international organisation to engage in espionage might give the lie to this example of diplomatic doublethink.
Efforts to address the threats posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction have led to a reconsideration of how intelligence can and should be used in bodies such as the United Nations. Understanding the threat posed and calibrating a response depends on access to national intelligence; if that response is to be multilateral, the legitimacy of any action taken may depend on sharing that intelligence. In the case of terrorist financing, this has led to legal challenges to the bases on which individuals’ assets are frozen, a topic addressed in this volume by Iain Cameron. Weapons inspections in Iraq through the 1990s and elsewhere have quietly drawn upon the assistance of “friendly” intelligence agencies, though the spectacular failure in Iraq severely undermined the credibility of this assistance. In a separate development, moves to pursue international criminal prosecutions through the 1990s in the Balkans and, to a lesser extent, Rwanda, required information that - in the absence of a meaningful investigative capacity - came from the intelligence services of governments.
This chapter will examine the use of intelligence in three areas - peacekeeping, weapons inspection, and international criminal prosecution - with a view to considering the accountability challenges posed by such cooperation.
Tuesday, April 7, 2009
Goodman: Rationales for Detention: Security Threats and Intelligence Value
In the essay, I contend that the law of armed conflict (LOAC) regulates the substantive grounds for detention in non-international armed conflicts and that LOAC prohibits long-term detention for the purpose of gathering intelligence.
Monday, July 16, 2007
New Issue: Michigan Journal of International Law
- SYMPOSIUM - STATE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
- Steven R. Ratner, Introduction
- Jeffrey H. Smith, Keynote Address
- Simon Chesterman, Secrets and Lies: Intelligence Activities and the Rule of Law in Times of Crisis
- Charles H.B. Garraway, State Intelligence Gathering: Conflict of Laws
- A. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law
- Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and International Law
- James E. Baker, What's International Law Got to Do With It? Transnational Law and the Intelligence Mission
- Francesca Bignami, Towards a Right to Privacy in Transnational Intelligence Networks
- Dieter Fleck, Individual and State Responsibility for Intelligence Gathering


