Internet shutdowns are on the surge across the globe, at least four dozen states-imposed internet shutdowns in 2024 alone, in armed conflicts and other situations. In some states where an authoritarian propensity or “digital sovereignty” reigns, internet shutdowns are being imposed to control political narratives during the conduct of hostilities. These states justify their actions using a “shut it off” argument, claiming that the internet is a luxury and further asserting that access to the internet may be overridden by national security or other justifications. On the other hand, there are states that advance open access to the internet in an uninhibited manner where internet must always be open even during armed conflicts. When the internet is cut off, by whatsoever reasons, they tend to advance the free access of the internet using “keep it on” argument.
This Article first seeks to explore these polarized debates of internet shutdown and then goes on to examine the legality of internet shutdowns under international law, mainly focusing on International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Drawing on insights from the “Three Generations of Digital Human Rights” project, which conceptualizes access to the internet as a standalone new digital right, this Article argues that imposing internet shutdowns during armed conflicts or other situations, without due regard to IHRL and IHL, undermines emerging digital rights, foremost of which is the right of access to the internet. Finally, the Article suggests that states should co-apply both IHRL and IHL before, during, and after the imposition of shutdown measures in situations of armed conflict.
Saturday, October 17, 2026
Ayalew: Between Shut It Off and Keep It On: The Legality of Internet Shutdowns under International Law
Monday, September 28, 2026
Call for Submissions: Cyber Law Toolkit
Sunday, October 12, 2025
Call for Submissions: Cyber Law Toolkit
Thursday, May 15, 2025
Conference: Regulating Security in Cyberspace
Monday, March 17, 2025
Call for Papers: Regulating Security in Cyberspace
Thursday, September 26, 2024
Call for Submissions: Cyber Law Toolkit
Wednesday, June 12, 2024
Kadlecová: Cyber Sovereignty: The Future of Governance in Cyberspace
Governments across the globe find themselves in an exploratory phase as they probe the limits of their sovereignty in the cyber domain. Cyberspace is a singular environment that is forcing states to adjust their behavior to fit a new arena beyond the four traditional domains (air, sea, space, and land) to which the classic understanding of state sovereignty applies. According to Lucie Kadlecová, governments must implement a more adaptive approach to keep up with rapid developments and innovations in cyberspace in order to truly retain their sovereignty. This requires understanding the concept of sovereignty in a more creative and flexible manner.
Kadlecová argues that the existence of sovereignty in cyberspace is the latest remarkable stage in the evolution of this concept. Through a close study of the most advanced transatlantic cases of state sovereignty in cyberspace—the Netherlands, the US, Estonia, and Turkey—Cyber Sovereignty reveals how states have pursued new methods and tactics to fuel the distribution of authority and control in the cyber field, imaginatively combining modern technologies with legal frameworks. In times of booming competition over cyber governance between democracies and authoritarian regimes worldwide, cyber sovereignty is a major topic of interest, and concern, for the international community.
Wednesday, May 22, 2024
Segura Serrano: Global Cybersecurity and International Law
Assessing the need to regulate cyberspace has triggered the re-emergence of new primary norms. This book evaluates the ability of existing international law to address the threat and use of force in cyberspace, redefining cyberwar and cyberpeace for the era of the Internet of Things. Covering critical issues such as the growing scourge of economic cyberespionage, international co-operation to fight cybercrime, the use of foreign policy instruments in cyber diplomacy, it also looks at state backed malicious cyberoperations, and the protection of human rights against State security activities. Offering a holistic examination of the ability of public international law, the book addresses the most pressing issues in global cybersecurity.
Tuesday, November 14, 2023
Conference: International Security in Cyberspace
Thursday, October 19, 2023
Call for Submissions: Cyber Law Toolkit
Wednesday, October 4, 2023
Johnstone, Sukumar, & Trachtman: Building an International Cybersecurity Regime: Multistakeholder Diplomacy
Providing a much-needed study on cybersecurity regime building, this comprehensive book is a detailed analysis of cybersecurity norm-making processes and country positions, through the lens of multi-stakeholder diplomacy. Multidisciplinary and multinational scholars and practitioners use insights drawn from high-level discussion groups to provide a rigorous analysis of how major cyber powers view multi-stakeholder diplomacy.
Looking at how past cybersecurity initiatives and multi-stakeholder negotiations in other fields illuminate its dynamics, this book will help put states' approaches towards multi-stakeholder cyber diplomacy into perspective, and frame the role of private actors in cybersecurity regime building. Evaluating the most promising institutional arrangements and mechanisms for implementing cybersecurity, this book combines top-down analyses relevant to the design of international cybersecurity regimes with bottom-up case studies, tracing the approaches of important states towards multi-stakeholder participation in cyber diplomacy.
Saturday, September 30, 2023
Pijpers: Influence Operations in Cyberspace and the Applicability of International Law
This enlightening book examines the use of online influence operations by foreign actors, and the extent to which these violate international law. It looks at key recent examples such as the 2016 UK EU Referendum, the 2016 American Presidential Election, and the 2017 French Presidential Election.
Applying existing international law to the new cyberspace domain fuels the discourse on how states interpret international law, which increases legal ambiguity. This book contributes to this discourse by analysing the core elements of interventions and sovereignty, including territorial integrity and political independence, and the extent to which these elements were violated in the three central case studies. It concludes by reflecting on the future of influence operations in cyberspace and providing instruments and tools to better define when and how international law has been violated.
Saturday, July 29, 2023
Call for Papers: International Security in Cyberspace
Monday, May 1, 2023
Wheatley: Election hacking, the rule of sovereignty, and deductive reasoning in customary international law
This article considers the international laws applicable to irresponsible state behaviour in cyberspace through the lens of the problem of election hacking. The rule of sovereignty has taken centre stage in these discussions and is said to be preferred to the non-intervention rule because it evades the problem of coercion. Proponents of the cyber rule of sovereignty contend that there is such a rule; opponents reject the existence of the rule as a matter of existing law. The objective here is to explore the methodologies involved in the identification of the cyber rule of sovereignty under customary international law. The work first frames the debate in the language of regulative and constitutive rules, allowing us to show that a regulative rule of sovereignty can, logically, and necessarily, be deduced from the constitutive rule of sovereignty. The content of the regulative rule can also be deduced from the constitutive rule of sovereignty, but it has a more limited scope than claimed by the proponents of the rule, notably the Tallinn Manual 2.0. The rule of sovereignty prohibits state cyber operations carried out on the territory of the target state and remote cyber operations which involve the exercise of sovereign authority on that territory, e.g., police evidence-gathering operations. The rule of sovereignty does not, however, prohibit other remote, ex situ state cyber operations, even those targeting ICTs used for governmental functions, including the conduct of elections. The rule of sovereignty is not, then, the solution to the problem of election hacking.
Saturday, March 25, 2023
Dothan: Facing Up to Internet Giants
Mancur Olson claimed that concentrated interests win against diffuse interests even in advanced democracies. Multinational companies, for example, work well in unison to suit their interests. The rest of the public is not motivated or informed enough to resist them. In contrast, other scholars argued that diffuse interests may be able to fight back, but only when certain conditions prevail. One of the conditions for the success of diffuse interests is the intervention of national and international courts. Courts are able to fix problems affecting diffuse interests. Courts can also initiate deliberation that can indirectly empower diffuse interests by getting them informed. This paper investigates the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It argues that these international courts help consumers, a diffuse interest group, to succeed in their struggle against internet companies, a concentrated interest group.
Wednesday, August 31, 2022
Call for Papers: CyCon 2023
Wednesday, August 17, 2022
Eichensehr: Not Illegal: The SolarWinds Incident and International Law
In 2021, the United States and other governments formally blamed Russia for a wide-ranging hacking campaign that breached the update process for SolarWinds Orion network monitoring software and used that access to compromise numerous government agencies, companies, and other entities. Despite denouncing Russia’s cyberespionage and imposing sanctions, the United States did not call Russia’s actions illegal as a matter of international law—and for good reason. Based on the publicly available facts, this article argues that the SolarWinds incident likely did not run afoul of international law as it currently stands. The article considers the prohibitions on the use of force and intervention, emerging rules with respect to cyber operations and violations of sovereign and due diligence, and international human rights law, and it concludes with some reflections on the role of states and scholars in decisions about whether to close gaps in international law.
Sunday, August 14, 2022
Hollis, van Benthem, & Dias: Information Operations under International Law
Information operations (IOs) can be defined as the deployment of digital resources for cognitive purposes to change or reinforce attitudes or behaviors of the targeted audience in ways that align with the authors’ interests. While not a new phenomenon, these operations have become increasingly prominent and pervasive in today’s digital age, a trend that the ongoing war in Ukraine and the use of the internet for terrorist purposes tragically demonstrate. Against this backdrop, this paper critically assesses the existing international legal framework applicable to IOs. It makes three overarching claims. First, IOs can cause real and tangible harms to individual and state interests protected by international law. To prevent and remedy such harms, a robust and comprehensive legal framework constraining the use of IOs by both state and non-state actors becomes a necessity. Second, existing international law regulates IOs through a system of prohibitions, permissions, and requirements. In particular, the paper analyzes the extent to which international human rights law, the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty, and due diligence obligations apply to state and non-state uses of IOs. Third, the fact that existing international law captures some of the harms of IOs does not mean that this framework is sufficient or adequate. In fact, we argue that, in their current form, international rules on IOs are only partially effective given challenges relating to their (i) application; (ii) orientation; (iii) complexity; and (iv) enforcement in the context of information and communications technologies. While accepting that international law, both conventional and customary, already contains important protections against harmful IOs, our analysis aims to reignite a much-needed discussion of the merits and shortcomings that adopting a new regime tailored to IOs might produce.




