Torture and the Recognition of Psychological Suffering in International Law finds that psychological suffering has posed difficulties for international human rights advocates and adjudicators working on the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. A systematic survey of the relevant international caselaw, the book presents, reveals a vast variation in how psychological suffering is found to violate the prohibition (or not). When singled out in cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and the UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), psychological suffering has never been specifically categorized as torture. What is more, psychological suffering has often been excluded altogether from the purview of the prohibition, categorized instead as ‘lawful sanctions’ or as falling below the ‘minimum level of severity’ threshold, and therefore not found to be a violation. Coupling caselaw analysis and interviews, this book provides numerous inter-related reasons: that socio-political standards recognizing the significance of psychological suffering are selectively applied or altogether overlooked; that categorization is subject to caution and conservatism; that scientific expertise documenting health impacts has not compelled adjudicators in all cases; and that interpretation still depends on sense-centric reasoning (intuition–emotion–presumption), potentially undercutting scientific expertise and perpetuating preconceptions associating severe suffering with the physical.
