In the more than 230 years since the Constitution took effect, the constitutional law governing the conduct of foreign affairs has evolved significantly. But that evolution did not come through formal amendments or Supreme Court rulings. Rather, the law has been defined by the practices of Congress and the executive branch, also known as “historical gloss.”
Curtis A. Bradley documents this process in action. He shows that expansions in presidential power over foreign affairs have often been justified by reference to historical gloss, but that Congress has not merely stepped aside. Belying conventional accounts of the “imperial presidency” in foreign affairs, Congress has also benefited from gloss, claiming powers for itself in the international arena not clearly addressed in the constitutional text and disrupting claims of exclusive presidential authority.
Historical Gloss and Foreign Affairs proposes a constitutional theory that can make sense of these legal changes. In contrast, originalist theories of constitutional interpretation often ignore influential post-Founding developments, while nonoriginalist theories tend to focus on judicial decisions rather than the actions and reasoning of Congress and the executive branch. Moreover, the constitutional theories that do focus on practice have typically emphasized changes at particular moments in time. What we see in the constitutional law of foreign affairs, however, is the long-term accumulation of nonjudicial precedents that is characteristic of historical gloss. With gloss confirmed as a prime mover in the development of foreign affairs law, we can begin to recognize its broader status as an important and longstanding form of constitutional reasoning.
Sunday, October 13, 2024
Bradley: Historical Gloss and Foreign Affairs: Constitutional Authority in Practice
Wednesday, March 20, 2024
Lange: Treaties in Parliaments and Courts: The Two Other Voices
Highlighting the close relationship between foreign relations law and international law, this impressive book places parliament and domestic courts’ engagement with treaties at the heart of its inquiry. It presents a timely assessment of the impact that different rules of constitutional law have on parliamentary and judicial approaches to treaties in four different states (Germany, India, South Africa and the US), thereby incorporating valuable comparative dimensions.
With intellectual rigour, Felix Lange demonstrates how diverse conceptions of foreign relations law affect whether parliaments act as promoters, shapers or translators of human rights treaties, the Rome Statute to the International Criminal Court, and climate change treaties. Lange not only analyses the ways in which domestic courts rely on treaties through consistent interpretation and direct application, but also how they may dismiss treaty provisions as non-self-executing or employ the concept of non-justiciability in matters of foreign affairs. Ultimately, Lange embraces the view that parliaments and courts are being increasingly heard and suggests that their voices should become even louder.
Wednesday, August 23, 2023
Call for Papers: IHL and Constitutional Law
Tuesday, December 20, 2022
Schill & Tams: International Investment Protection and Constitutional Law
This book develops a conceptual framework that captures not only the tensions between constitutional values that are common to liberal democracies – human rights, democracy, and the rule of law – and the investment treaty regime, but also the potential for co-existence and complementarity.
Contributions from leading experts in the field address how different systems of constitutional law interact with the investment treaty regime. Chapters provide a detailed overview of the various forms of interaction, and critically engage with the competing claims for supremacy that constitutional law and international investment law formulate. The book also addresses the reactions within the investment treaty regime to the demands formulated by constitutional law, in particular the use of constitutional analogies to understand international investment law and investor-state dispute settlement.
Tuesday, March 8, 2022
Call for Papers: International Law and Constitution-Making
Call for Papers: Symposium on “International Law and Constitution-Making”
The Rutgers Center for Transnational Law (United States) in partnership with the Diego Portales Public Law Program (Chile) have issued a call for papers for a symposium on International Law and Constitution-Making. The symposium is sponsored by the American Society of International Law—Latin America Interest Group and The Chilean Chapter of the International Society of Public Law.
Date & location: Wednesday, May 18, 2022, Rutgers Law School (Camden campus)
Can international law affect constitution-making processes carried out by sovereign states? Should such processes follow international human rights law and international economic law? If so, how? Is sovereignty at risk when states cede to international organizations too much power and influence?
The Rutgers Center for Transnational Law and The Diego Portales School of Law (Chile) will host a symposium that will analyze these and other questions concerning the role of international law in the drafting of new constitutions, with a focus on the constituent process that is currently taking place in Chile—one that scholars around the world follow with great anticipation, as it is the first process in the world which has full gender parity and an enhanced role for indigenous peoples. By convening comparative constitutional scholars and international lawyers, we plan to discuss and reflect on the risks and possibilities that international law poses to countries that use international law in their constituent processes.
Professor Richard Albert from the University of Texas and Professor Mila Versteeg from the University of Virginia School of Law will give keynote addresses.
*** Please submit an abstract of no more than 500 words to ctl@law.rutgers.edu or programaderechopublico@mail.udp.cl by April 1st, 2022, with the subject line “Rutgers/UDP Symposium.”
The symposium has secured funding to support a number the travel and accommodation of a number of participants. If you can partially support your travel to Philadelphia, please indicate so in your application.
Selected papers will be published in English in the Rutgers International Law & Human Rights Journal,and in Spanish in the Anuario de Derecho Público, published by the Diego Portales Law School.
Questions? Email jorge.contesse@rutgers.edu or domingo.lovera@udp.cl.
Sunday, July 21, 2019
Wuerth: The Due Process and other Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations
The rights of foreign states under the U.S. Constitution are becoming more important because the actions of foreign states and foreign state-owned enterprises are expanding in scope and the legislative protections to which they are entitled are contracting. Conventional wisdom and lower court cases hold that foreign states are outside our constitutional order and that they are protected neither by separation of powers nor by due process. As a matter of policy, however, it makes little sense to afford litigation-related constitutional protections to foreign corporations and individuals, but to deny categorically such protections to foreign states.
A careful analysis of Article III and of the Fifth Amendment shows that the conventional wisdom and lower court cases are wrong. Foreign states are protected by Article III’s extension of judicial power to foreign-state diversity cases, the purpose of which was to protect foreign states from unfair proceedings and to prevent international conflict. The Article III “judicial power” over “cases” also presupposes both personal jurisdiction (over any kind of defendant) and other process-based limitations. The Fifth Amendment overlaps with Article III in important ways. It also protects foreign states. They are “persons” due the same constitutional “process” to which other defendants are entitled. Modern scholars have struggled to see the connection between due process and personal jurisdiction. The cases involving the immunity of foreign states makes the connection clear for all defendants. “Process” only reached defendants within sovereign power, or jurisdiction, of the issuing court.
Examining the Constitution from the perspective of foreign states thus reveals the document in a new light, illuminating its core features in ways that advance our historical and theoretical understanding of the Constitution, with significant implications for several additional areas of modern doctrine. The analysis of separation of powers and due process also lays the groundwork for determining whether foreign states have additional constitutional rights.
Friday, May 10, 2019
Ruys, Ferro, & Haesebrouck: Parliamentary war powers and the role of international law in foreign troop deployment decisions: The US-led coalition against “Islamic State” in Iraq and Syria
This article addresses the degree of parliamentary involvement in decisions to deploy armed forces abroad. It observes how the recourse to force by the US-led military coalition fighting against the so-called Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, or Da’esh) in Iraq and Syria seems to fit into a broader trend of increased parliamentary control over war-and-peace decisions on both sides of the Atlantic. Inasmuch as international legal arguments can and do play a role in parliamentary debates and concomitant resolutions, this trend carries the potential of contributing to the compliance pull of the jus ad bellum. Against this background, the article explores to what extent newfound war powers on the part of national parliaments go hand in hand with recourse to international legal arguments. The article engages this question through an analysis of the dialogue between the executive and legislative branches in a number of countries (in particular Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Canada) pertaining to the participation in the US-led coalition against IS.
Thursday, March 21, 2019
Motoc & Volikas: The Dialogue between the ECHR and the Italian Constitutional Court: The Saga of “GIEM and Others v Italy”
Following a series of cases brought against Italy in relation to non-conviction based confiscation, the European Court of Human Rights engaged in a judicial dialogue with the Italian Constitutional Court over the correct interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights and in particular Article 7. This article elaborates on the background of this dialogue and analyses the European Court's position in its most recent judgement in this saga: GIEM and Others v Italy.
Thursday, March 14, 2019
Marxsen: Bündnissolidarität und Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr – Verfassungs- und völkerrechtliche Grundlagen
Dieser Aufsatz analysiert die rechtlichen Voraussetzungen für Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr. In einem ersten Schritt werden dabei die völkerrechtlichen Anforderungen rekapituliert. Alsdann werden die Voraussetzungen des Grundgesetzes in den Blick genommen, wobei insbesondere die Regeln über die Beteiligung an Bündniseinsätzen eingehend analysiert werden. Die These des Aufsatzes ist, dass wir international gegenwärtig einen problematischen Trend erleben, demzufolge Militäreinsätze weniger in vom U.N. Sicherheitsrat autorisierten Missionen, sondern zunehmend in nur partikularen Bündnissen erfolgen. Diese Entwicklung kann für die Bundesrepublik zu Konflikten mit den völkerrechtlichen, aber auch verfassungsrechtlichen Anforderungen für Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr führen.
The article analyses the legal requirements for the deployment of German military troops abroad. First, it provides an overview on the relevant international legal rules, especially of the prohibition on the use of force and its exceptions that Germany is obliged to observe. It then discusses the legal framework and practice under the German Grundgesetz under which military operations in alliance with other countries are the standard case. The article then argues that we are currently witnessing a problematic turn from military operations conducted based on an authorization of the U.N. Security Council to such operations carried out in smaller, partial alliances outside the universalist framework of the U.N. It is shown that this trend can conflict with German obligations under international as well as German constitutional law.
Tuesday, February 19, 2019
Hoffmann: Divergenz und Transformation: Verfassungstheoretische Untersuchung des Eigentumsschutzes in der demokratischen Eigentumsverfassung und im Investitionsschutzregime
Die Arbeit untersucht mithilfe verfassungstheoretischer Annahmen die Auswirkungen des internationalen Investitionsschutzrechts auf die Ausgestaltung des Eigentumsschutzes in nationalen Verfassungen. Im Ergebnis ergibt sich, dass der demokratische Eigentumskompromiss und der Schutz von Rechtspositionen nach dem Investitionsschutzrecht unterschiedlich ausgestaltet sind. Investitionsschutzrechtlicher Eigentumsschutz ist an einem hohen Schutzstandard für Investoren orientiert, während der demokratische Eigentumskompromiss einen Ausgleich schafft zwischen Eigentumsschutz auf der einen Seite und Gemeinwohlinteressen auf der anderen Seite. Als Fallillustrationen dienen die Verfassungen von Deutschland, Südafrika und Australien und aktuelle Investitionsstreitigkeiten, die diese Länder betrafen (u. a. Philip Morris und Vattenfall). Darüber hinaus wird aufgezeigt, dass diese Divergenz zwischen den beiden Regimen auch zu einer Transformation des demokratischen Eigentumskompromisses führen kann.
Based on assumptions from constitutional theory, this book examines the effects of international investment law on domestic constitutions and finds that the democratic compromise on property protection and the protection of legal positions under international investment law are structured differently. Protection of property under international investment law is oriented towards a high standard of protection for investors, while the democratic compromise on property protection strikes a balance between property protection on the one hand and public welfare interests on the other. The constitutions of Germany, South Africa and Australia and investment disputes concerning these countries (including Philip Morris and Vattenfall) serve as case illustrations. In addition, the study shows that the divergence between these two legal principles can also lead to a transformation of the democratic property compromise.
Thursday, November 15, 2018
Symposium: The Law of Nations and the United States Constitution
- William S. Dodge, Customary International Law, Change, and the Constitution
- David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Law of Nations and the Constitution: An Early Modern Perspective
- John Harrison, The Constitution and the Law of Nations
- Thomas H. Lee, The Law of Nations and the Judicial Branch
- Michael D. Ramsey, The Constitution’s Text and Customary International Law
- Paul B. Stephan, Inferences of Judicial Lawmaking Power and the Law of Nations
- Ingrid Wuerth, The Future of the Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations
- Transcript: The Judicial Perspective Panel
- Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, Why Federal Courts Apply the Law of Nations Even Though it is Not the Supreme Law of the Land
Monday, August 6, 2018
Chehtman: International Law and Constitutional Law in Latin America
This contribution examines the relationship between international law and domestic law in Latin America. It assesses whether international norms can be validly invoked before local authorities, what the hierarchy conferred upon them is, as well as the status of decisions and other pronouncements by supranational bodies, most notably those of the Inter-American System. All in all, it documents the increasing importance that international law has achieved within Latin American legal systems since the wave of Constitutional reforms that started in the mid-1980s. In this context, it highlights the privileged status generally conferred upon international human rights law, within domestic constitutional systems, by means of its constitutionalization. However, on the basis of three cases-studies on Argentina, Mexico and Colombia, this contribution shows that in practice domestic authorities have had a zigzagging attitude vis-à-vis the hierarchy and applicability of international human rights norms, particularly with respect to the decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Ultimately, I argue that this particular feature can be explained neither by the relevant legal provisions in the American Convention on Human Rights or in the national Constitutions, nor through the expansive jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Rather, the best explanation for it is through the political needs of local high courts at different times. Nevertheless, this ultimately shows that despite what all of these courts state in their jurisprudence, we lack an adequate model to regulate the specific terms of the relationship between domestic courts and their supranational counterparts.
Sunday, December 10, 2017
Workshop: International Investment Law and Constitutional Law
Frankfurt Investment Law Workshop 2018: International Investment Law and Constitutional Law (9-10 March 2018)
For many years, the Frankfurt Investment Law Workshop – jointly organized by Rainer Hofmann (Frankfurt), Stephan W. Schill (Amsterdam), and Christian J. Tams (Glasgow) – has been a forum for the discussion of foundational issues of international investment law.
The 2018 workshop addresses the increasingly relevant relationship between international investment law and constitutional law. While both fields, for a long time, have kept maximum distance to each other, they are beginning to interact as constitutional courts around the world, such as the German Federal Constitutional Court, the French Conseil Constitutionnel, and the Court of Justice of the European Union, are being called to address the constitutional limits of international investment law and investment dispute settlement. Similarly, investment tribunals increasingly face constitutional law arguments, and investment law scholarship promotes the use of constitutional legal analysis to step up to the challenges the field is facing as an instrument of global governance.
The 2018 Frankfurt Investment Law Workshop will explore the different facets of the increasing interaction between international investment law and constitutional law and critically analyze the opportunities and challenges this interaction creates. The Workshop will bring together academics and practitioners and provide them with a forum for open and frank exchanges.
The program is available here; for edited collections that have grown out of earlier Frankfurt Investment Law Workshops see here, here, here, and here.
If you are interested in attending, please contact Sabine Schimpf, Merton Centre for European Integration and International Economic Order, University of Frankfurt, E-Mail: S.Schimpf@jur.uni-frankfurt.de by 23 February 2018.
Tuesday, January 19, 2016
Glennon & Sloane: The Sad, Quiet Death of Missouri v. Holland: How Bond Hobbled the Treaty Power
Many anticipated that Bond v. United States (2014) would confirm or overrule Justice Holmes’s canonical decision in Missouri v. Holland (1920). Bond is now considered to have done neither; rather, it purportedly elided the constitutional issue by applying the canon of constitutional avoidance to the treaty’s implementing legislation, thus resolving Bond on statutory grounds alone and leaving Holland’s validity for another day. We argue to the contrary that Bond eviscerated Holland. Chief Justice Roberts proceeded from the premise that “the statute — unlike the [treaty] — must be read consistent with principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional structure.” This premise, upon which the core of the Court’s subsequent analysis relied, is not, as the orthodox reading suggests, a mere clear-statement rule. By its terms, it is mandatory rather than precatory; and it cannot be reconciled with Holland. It abjures Holland’s holding that a treaty and its implementing legislation must be evaluated together and that, under the Tenth Amendment, the validity of the latter depends upon the constitutionality in this regard of the treaty itself. Further, the federalism-based canon of constitutional avoidance and the background principle on which the Court relied both tacitly, but necessarily, presupposed that Holland is no longer good law. Holland nonetheless continues to represent the most sensible and defensible reconciliation of the tension between the Treaty Clause and the Tenth Amendment. By abandoning Holland, the Court has interpreted the Constitution as disabling the nation from honoring international obligations of the sort at issue in Medellín v. Texas — in which the Court held that the federal government can do what Bond now holds it cannot. Bond took a lamentable step backwards for the United States, recreating one of the paramount problems that beset the nation under the Articles of Confederation.
Tuesday, July 29, 2014
Call for Papers: The (Comparative) Constitutional Law of Private-Public Arbitration
Call for Papers
Lex Mercatoria Publica - Workshop
The (Comparative) Constitutional Law of Private‐Public Arbitration
Heidelberg, November 21‐22, 2014
Arbitrations between private economic actors and public law bodies are on the rise, both under international investment treaties and contracts between private and public actors, such as concession agreements or public‐private‐partnerships. Arbitrators, instead of domestic courts, now settle a wide variety of private‐public disputes, ranging from the simple non‐fulfillment of contractual obligations to complex disputes about the limits of states’ regulatory powers. Yet, in doing so, they not only settle disputes, but also review the legality of government acts and incrementally develop the applicable law. Arbitrators thereby become important law‐makers that generate the law governing public‐private relations rather independently of specific domestic legal systems and their democratic processes. The body of law thus developed, designated for present purposes as lex mercatoria publica, may then prospectively steer and restrict government conduct.
Relegating the resolution of private‐public disputes to arbitration raises questions of legitimacy and concerns for principles of constitutional law, such as democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of fundamental rights, because governments are controlled, and the concrete delineation of private rights and public interests is drawn, not by democratically legitimized domestic courts, but by party‐appointed one‐off arbitral tribunals. Concerns of a constitutional nature are all the more significant as arbitration proceedings in private‐public disputes do not conform to safeguards that are usually in place in public law adjudication in domestic courts, such as transparency of the proceedings, possibilities for third‐party participation, limitations on damages as public law remedies, or the need for public law expertise of adjudicators. Instead, arbitration generally follows private law rationales, such as party autonomy and confidentiality of the proceedings. All of this may endanger how states regulate in the public interest. It raises questions, such as: how are arbitrators in such proceedings legitimized? What powers do they, or should they have? What is their proper role when reviewing government acts? What is the appropriate normative framework governing their activity? Is the consent of the disputing parties sufficient to legitimize private‐public arbitrations, or are farther‐reaching public law strictures necessary?
The ERC‐funded Lex Mercatoria Publica Project under the direction of Dr. Stephan Schill (a brief description is here) aims at developing a solid framework for assessing legitimacy concerns relating to private‐public arbitration. However, rather than discussing in the abstract how constitutional ideals may impact private‐public arbitration, it aims at developing criteria to assess the legitimacy of private‐public arbitrations through comparative analysis of concrete constitutional regimes. It wants to explore the conditions under which different domestic legal systems, as well as supranational regional regimes, permit private‐public arbitrations, and distil, if possible, common principles, or develop different models, from such a comparative exercise. How does, for example, Columbian, Brazilian, Chinese, Indian, French, Russian, South‐African, or US (constitutional) law and practice look at the involvement of its and other government entities in arbitration? Does it treat it differently from commercial arbitration between private parties? To which extent does it permit it? How does it regulate private‐arbitration? What control mechanisms does it establish in order to ensure that the public interest is safeguarded when public entities agree to have disputes resolved through arbitration rather than in domestic courts? Similarly, what is the position, for example, of ASEAN, the EU, the Council of Europe, the Inter‐American Convention on Human Rights, OHADA, or COMESA on these issues?
Against this background, a workshop is convened at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg on November 21‐22, 2014, which focuses on the constitutional law of private‐public arbitration in a comparative perspective. It aims to receive contributions from participants that will address, in the form of national reports or (regional) comparative analyses, how a specific jurisdiction (e.g., Spain, Egypt, or Russia), a group of countries (e.g., West‐Africa, Central‐Asia, Central Europe), or a regional organization (e.g., OHADA, ASEAN) approach and regulate private‐public arbitration and how they ensure that the public interest is safeguarded when public entities agree to arbitrate disputes. Contract‐based as well as investment treaty‐based, domestic and international arbitration should be considered.
We hope to receive contributions reporting on jurisdictions that are representative of as many of the world’s legal systems as possible and particularly encourage contributions from jurisdictions that are usually under‐represented in comparative law research, including from Latin‐America, Africa, and Asia. Possible contributors can be specialists in arbitration with expertise in constitutional and administrative law or vice‐versa specialists in constitutional or administrative law with knowledge of arbitration.
Submission of Proposals and Timeline
Original and non‐published submissions from both junior and senior academics and practitioners are invited on the themes outlined above. An abstract of max. 800 words and the applicant’s CV should be sent (in .pdf or .doc format) to lex‐mp@mpil.de by 15 September 2014. Abstracts must include the legal order(s) considered, the approach taken by the author, and the major arguments to be made.
A selection panel will consider all abstracts and notify applicants of acceptance by 30 September 2014. Applicants must be prepared to circulate a draft of their paper by 10 November 2014. Following the Workshop, papers must be prepared for publication in an edited monograph with a leading international publisher. Costs for travel and accommodation will be covered by the organizers.
If you are unable to attend the workshop, but are interested in contributing to the edited volume, we are equally happy to receive your statement of interest. Please direct inquiries to lex‐mp@mpil.de.
Sunday, March 23, 2014
Eppinger, Knop, & Riles: Diplomacy and Its Others: The Case of Korean Comfort Women
How can critical legal feminists find a way to respond, truthfully and ethically, to the horrors of wartime sexual slavery institutionalized in the Japanese military’s system of “Comfort Women,” while recognizing, at the same time, that claims on behalf of victims of sexual violence are often appropriated by nationalist, imperialist, and capitalist agendas? A first step is to understand how the bewildering range of political, legal, and cultural interventions that constitute the Comfort Women incident collide with one another, refashion one another, and give one another energy. Part of a larger project on the place of multi-situational law in an equally multi-situational politics, this brief presentation, as a very first step, identifies what we term the diplomatic style and analyses its collision with the constitutional law style in a landmark 2011 judgment of the Constitutional Court of Korea.
The Court found the Korean government liable for violating the constitutional rights of former Comfort Women because it has not used the dispute settlement procedure available under a 1965 bilateral treaty to seek compensation from the government of Japan. This result is in marked contrast to a 2010 Philippine decision on the equivalent issue as regards Filipina Comfort Women. In keeping with the reluctance of courts in many countries to intervene in foreign affairs, the Supreme Court of the Philippines held that the “political question” doctrine in domestic law prevented it from considering the wisdom of the Philippine government’s position that all postwar claims against Japan have been settled, and held, furthermore, that a state has no duty of diplomatic protection under international law.
We show that distinguishing diplomacy from other law/politics concerns that account for courts’ hands-off approach to foreign affairs helps us to think about the implications of the Korean Constitutional Court’s judgment. By injecting itself into diplomacy, and by taking on the responsibility for managing diplomatic tactics, the Court also makes itself relevant — and arguably vulnerable — to the constituencies to which diplomats have long been vulnerable. Whereas scholars often tend to treat law as a funnel for politics, the relationship of law to politics becomes (as with the relationship of diplomacy to politics) more of an eddy than a funnel. It is on this point, more than on the linkage of international rights to constitutional duties, that we perceive a glimmer of feminist hope in the decision.
Tuesday, September 17, 2013
Cleveland & Dodge: Defining and Punishing Offenses Under Treaties
The Offenses Clause of the Constitution gives Congress power “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.” Past scholarship has assumed that the Clause allows Congress to enforce only customary international law. This article demonstrates that this conventional academic wisdom is mistaken and that the Offenses Clause constitutes an additional source of authority for Congress to implement certain treaty commitments. The Framers of the Constitution clearly understood the law of nations to include treaties, or what they called “the conventional law of nations.” The history of the Offenses Clause shows that it was intended to reach treaties and thus to facilitate compliance with the United States’ international commitments. Moreover, despite the prevailing view in the academy, Congress, the Executive, and the Supreme Court have shared this understanding of the Clause through most of our nation’s history.
The Offenses Clause provides a cautionary tale about the dangers of reading constitutional text without sensitivity to its historical background and demonstrates the need for care in translating that text into modern terms. Our argument also has significance for a range of contemporary contexts — from piracy to international counter-narcotics activity — and for the case of Bond v. United States, currently pending before the United States Supreme Court. Most fundamentally, our argument contributes to understanding the role of international law in our constitutional scheme. It underscores the importance that the Framers placed on crafting a national government with robust authorities to fully enforce treaties and customary international law.
Monday, August 12, 2013
Bradley: Treaty Termination and Constitutional Change
The termination of U.S. treaties provides an especially rich example of how governmental practices can inform and even define the Constitution’s separation of powers. The authority to terminate treaties is not addressed specifically in the constitutional text and instead has been worked out over time through political branch practice. This practice, moreover, has developed largely without judicial review. Despite these features, Congress and the President — and the lawyers who advise them — have generally treated this issue as a matter of constitutional law, not merely political happenstance. Importantly, the example of treaty termination illustrates not only how historical practice can inform constitutional understandings, but also how these understandings can change. In the nineteenth century, the prevailing view was that the termination of treaties required either congressional or senatorial approval. That understanding changed in the twentieth century, and unilateral presidential termination became the norm. The contours of this shift likely apply to other issues of constitutional law relating to presidential authority: First there is a consensus, both among the governmental actors and in the scholarly community. Then deviations take place with a potentially limited scope. The Executive Branch proceeds to articulate broader theories of the deviations. Congress’s resistance is intermittent, depending on whether it objects to the deviations on policy grounds. Practice then builds up around low-stakes examples. Eventually a more controversial example arises and the President pushes forward successfully, thereby consolidating the changed understanding. This dynamic of accretion and consolidation of institutional practice is not adequately captured by theories of constitutional change that focus on judicial review or that emphasize particular moments of contestation or public deliberation.
Tuesday, March 12, 2013
Bettauer: Supreme Court May Consider How Broadly the “Necessary and Proper” Clause of the Constitution Authorizes Legislation to Implement Treaties
Wednesday, February 13, 2013
Bradley: International Law in the U.S. Legal System
Curtis A. Bradley (Duke Univ. - Law) has published International Law in the U.S. Legal System (Oxford Univ. Press 2013). Here's the abstract:International Law in the U.S. Legal System explores the dynamic intersection between international law and the domestic legal system within the United States and covers both settled principles as well as unresolved issues and areas of controversy. Curtis Bradley considers all of the principal forms of international law: treaties, decisions and orders of international institutions, customary international law, and jus cogens norms. He also explores a number of specific topics that are implicated by the intersection of U.S. law and international law, such as foreign sovereign immunity, international human rights litigation, extradition, war powers, and extraterritoriality. As he explains, international law plays an important and sometimes under-appreciated role in the U.S. legal system, but its domestic application is mediated by a variety of structural considerations, including federalism and the separation of powers. This book highlights recent decisions and events relating to the topic (including decisions and events arising out of the war on terrorism), while also taking into account relevant historical materials, including materials relating to the U.S. constitutional founding. The book is designed to be accessible to a wide range of lawyers, judges, law students, and policymakers, both inside and outside the United States.




