National security has expanded from existential and military threats into trade, investment, technology, supply chains and industrial policy. This chapter asks how states perceive which security game they are playing. Material vulnerabilities and weaponized interdependence can rationally alter incentives. Furthermore, strategic interaction is networked rather than dyadic: policies and influence propagate through alliances, trade relations and third states. National narratives, framing and behavioural mechanisms shape perceived payoffs, actors and time horizons. Positive-sum interdependence may consequently be reframed as zero-sum competition, generating security dilemmas, while bandwagon effects and behavioural security inflation can exacerbate that process. Measures rational in the short run may create greater insecurity over time. National institutions determine who defines and contests threats and thus comparative variations matter. International law is therefore not merely a constraint. By stabilising expectations, providing information and monitoring, coordinating networked responses and limiting opportunistic security exceptions, it can preserve opportunities for positive-sum cooperation and prevent security narratives from becoming self-fulfilling realities.
Saturday, October 10, 2026
van Aaken: Which Game Are We Playing? Geoeconomics, Behavioral Security Inflation and International Law
Anne van Aaken (Univ. of Hamburg - Law) has posted Which Game Are We Playing? Geoeconomics, Behavioral Security Inflation and International Law. Here's the abstract:
