This article explores why governments commit to human rights enforcement by joining the International Criminal Court (ICC). Compared with other international institutions, the ICC has substantial authority and autonomy. Since governments traditionally guard their sovereignty carefully, it is puzzling that the ICC was not only established, but established so rapidly. Looking beyond traditional explanations for joining international institutions, this study identifies a new causal factor: a country’s dependence network, which consists of the set of other states that control resources the country values. This study captures different dimensions of what states value through trade relations, security alliances, and shared memberships in international organizations. Using event history analysis on monthly data from 1998 to 2004, we find that dependence networks strongly affect whether and when a state signs and ratifies the ICC. Some types of ratification costs also influence state commitment, but many conventional explanations of state commitment receive little empirical support.
Wednesday, January 11, 2012
Goodliffe et al.: Dependence Networks and the International Criminal Court
Jay Goodliffe (Brigham Young Univ. - Political Science), Darren Hawkins (Brigham Young Univ. - Political Science), Christine Horne (Washington State Univ. - Sociology), & Daniel L. Nielson (Brigham Young Univ. - Political Science) have posted Dependence Networks and the International Criminal Court (International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming). Here's the abstract: