The Société Française pour le Droit International has published La responsabilité de protéger - Colloque de Nanterre (Pedone 2008). Contents are available here. Here's the abstract:Cet ouvrage constitue les actes du 41ème colloque de la Société française pour le droit international qui s'est tenu à l'Université de Paris X-Nanterre du 7 au 9 juin 2007.
For Ukraine:Romania respectfully requests the Court to draw a single maritime boundary dividing the maritime areas of Romania and Ukraine in the Black Sea, having the following description:
(a) from point F, at 45° 05' 21" N, 30° 02' 27" E, on the 12-nautical-mile arc surrounding Serpents’ Island, to point X, at 45° 14' 20" N, 30° 29' 12" E;
(b) from point X in a straight segment to point Y, at 45° 11' 59" N, 30° 49' 16" E;
(c) then on the line equidistant between the relevant Romanian and Ukrainian adjacent coasts, from point Y, passing through point D, at 45° 12' 10" N, 30° 59' 46" E, to point T, at 45° 09' 45" N, 31° 08' 40" E;
(d) and then on the line median between the relevant Romanian and Ukrainian opposite coasts, from point T - passing through the points of 44° 35' 00" N, 31° 13' 43" E and of 44° 04' 05" N, 31° 24' 40" E, to point Z, at 43° 26' 50" N, 31° 20' 10" E.
For the reasons given in Ukraine’s written and oral pleadings, Ukraine requests the Court to adjudge and declare that the line delimiting the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones between Ukraine and Romania is as follows:
(a) from the point (point 1) identified in Article 1 of the 2003 Treaty between Ukraine and Romania on the Régime of the Ukrainian-Romanian State Border, having the co-ordinates of 45° 05' 21" N; 30° 02' 27" E, the line runs along a straight line to point 2, having the co-ordinates of 44° 54' 00" N; 30° 06' 00" E; then
(b) from point 2, the line runs along an azimuth of 156° to point 3, having the co-ordinates of 43° 20' 37" N; 31° 05' 39" E; and then continues along the same azimuth until it reaches a point where the interests of third States potentially come into play.
The co-ordinates are referenced to the Pulkovo datum (i.e., using the Krasovsky ellipsoid), and all lines are loxodromes.
The subprime meltdown, inflation, global food shortage, and rising oil prices . . . the world has become a very different place as we entered 2008. How will the new economic environment affect the World Trade Organization (WTO), and how shall the WTO deal with these new challenges in such difficult time? Bringing together leading WTO scholars from Asia and beyond, this international conference will provide a good opportunity to reflect upon some of the most pressing issues facing the multilateral trading system today.
Oxford University Press recently launched online the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, edited by Rüdiger Wolfrum. This is a new edition of the Encyclopedia of Public International Law, which was published between 1991 and 2001 under the direction of Rudolf Bernhardt. Articles are being uploaded in phases. Thus far, over 450 articles are online; another set is due to be uploaded in October. A list of recently published articles is here; a list of all planned articles is here. A print version will appear once online publication is completed in 2010.
Cosponsored by Washington College of Law, the National Institute of Military Justice and the Federalist Society, and in cooperation with the ABA Section of International Law National Security Committee. The next conversation in global counter-terrorism will consider the long-term future of terrorist-related detentions. The resolution of this conversation will depend on chosen model to govern the detention. Many lawyers have argued that the United States and its allies are at war with terrorists under the laws of armed conflict. Yet others counter that terrorism is fundamentally a domestic criminal offense and should be prosecuted under the law enforcement paradigm. While substantial efforts have been made to resolve these and related disagreements by making procedural alterations in the military commissions or the proposed National Security Court, many critics argue that these modifications are unable to overcome the very same conceptual challenges that justify the changes. After more than six years of discussion, this issue remains unresolved within the legal community. This conference advances that conversation by asking whether the law enforcement and international humanitarian law models are able to theoretically address the unique characteristics of international terrorism or whether new concepts are needed.
On September 11th, the ICTY Trial Chamber rendered its judgment in the case (No. IT-03-67-R77.1) against Ljubiša Petković. Petković was charged (order here) with contempt of the Tribunal for having knowingly and willfully interfered in the administration of justice by refusing to respect a summons and appear as a witness before the Chamber.
On Monday, the ICTY Trial Chamber rendered its judgment in the case (No. IT-04-83) against Rasim Delić, former Commander of the Main Staff of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Delić was charged, under a theory of superior responsibility, with four counts of war crimes (murder, cruel treatment, and rape) for failure to take reasonable steps to prevent and punish crimes that occurred during his command (amended indictment here). In February of this year, the Trial Chamber, in an oral decision (transcript here), acquitted Delić of one of the counts (rape).
This paper seeks to establish the viability of the "convergence" thesis as applied to common and civil law by an examination of the emergence of international criminal law, particularly as it is applied by international criminal tribunals. It suggests that the concept of "legal hybrid" is that which most approximates the conditions in which two legal systems or traditions do not simply overlap, but blend into a sui generis system that is more than the sum of both. It traces the dynamics of that hybridization, in an attempt to understand how transystemic "areas" in the law are produced, sustained and developed.
Rachel Bzostek (California State Univ., Bakersfield - Political Science) has published Why Not Preempt? Security, Law, Norms and Anticipatory Military Activities (Ashgate 2008). Here's the abstract:Anticipatory military activities, which include both preemptive and preventive military actions, are at the centre of American strategic doctrine – however, states rarely use these activities. Rachel Bzostek puts forward an integrated analysis to help understand why states have or have not undertaken such activities in the past. By exploring what kinds of strategic or structural elements compel states or leaders to take anticipatory military action, as well as how these concepts are viewed in both international law and the just war tradition, this book uses case studies to explore those elements that have played an influential role in the decision-making process.
This article analyzes international investment protection law by using tools of economic contract theory. Contract theory has been applied to international trade law, but investment law has not yet been analyzed under this methodology.
Bilateral Investment Treaties or International Investment Agreements may be interpreted as a mechanism for overcoming commitment problems between investor and host state in order to generate mutual benefits. States thereby trade credibility for sovereignty as international investment law restricts the regulatory conduct of states to an unusual extent, subject to control through compulsory international adjudication. A well-known problem in contract theory is how to deal with uncertainty. Parties cannot easily design contracts that maximize jointly beneficial investments and at the same time respond appropriately to changing conditions ex post. Changing conditions are a prevalent characteristic in investment law covering long term investments. Contract theory finds that too strict and inflexible contracts may impair the joint surplus of the contracting parties. Thus, a trade-off arises between ex ante strong commitment devices on the one hand and flexibility ex post in order to uphold the efficiency of the contract on the other hand. The article analyzes commitment and flexibility mechanism in international investment protection law and proposes to use similar mechanisms to the WTO law in order to design more optimal contracts (that is investment treaties).
Bernhard Knoll (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) has published The Legal Status of Territories Subject to Administration by International Organisations (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008). Here's the abstract:The international community’s practice of administering territories in post-conflict environments has raised important legal questions. Using Kosovo as a case study, Bernhard Knoll analyses the identity of the administrating UN organ, the ways in which the territories under consideration have acquired partial subjectivity in international law and the nature of legal obligations in the fiduciary exercise of transitional administration developed within the League of Nations’ Mandate and the UN Trusteeship systems. Knoll discusses Kosovo’s internal political and constitutional order and notes the absence of some of the characteristics normally found in liberal democracies, before proposing that the UN consolidates accountability guidelines related to the protection of human rights and the development of democratic standards should it engage in the transitional administration of territory.
International law scholars debate when international rules matter to states and what affects compliance. One of the few areas of agreement is that fairly robust levels of compliance can be achieved by tapping into states' concerns with their reputation. The logic is intuitively appealing: a state that violates international law develops a bad reputation, which leads other states to exclude the violator from future cooperative opportunities. Anticipating a loss of future gains, states will often comply with international rules that are not in their immediate interests. The level of compliance that reputation can sustain depends, however, on how the government decision-makers value the possibility of being excluded from future cooperative agreements. This paper examines how governments internalize reputational costs to the "state" and how audiences evaluate the predictive value of violating governments' actions. The paper concludes that reputation, as currently conceived, is unlikely to be a robust source of compliance.
Although the problem of prosecutorial discretion at the International Criminal Court has received some critical attention, the current scholarship has insufficiently addressed the complex relationship between prosecutorial discretion in individual criminal cases and the Security Council's Chapter VII authority at the collective level. The Office of the Prosecutor apparently believes that it has broad authority to initiate an independent review even after a Security Council referral, though the Office voluntarily recognizes that matters of peace are better left to other institutions within public international law. By making a distinction between general and specific discretion, this article develops the argument that the ICC Prosecutor's discretion is in fact greatly constrained by Security Council referrals, despite the fact that the Rome Statute purports to give the prosecutor discretion to make decisions based on the "interests of justice". If the phrase "the interests of justice" is interpreted to incorporate matters of justice at the collective level, then the Rome Statute's putative grant of discretion to the ICC Prosecutor conflicts with the basic structure of international legal institutions.
The latest issue of the Journal du Droit International ("Clunet") (Vol. 135, no. 3, Juillet-Août-Septembre 2008) is out. Contents include:
Gareth Evans (President, International Crisis Group) has published The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Brookings Institution Press 2008). Here's the abstract:After the Holocaust, the world vowed it would “never again!” permit such mass atrocity crimes, yet many have since gone unchecked, from the killing fields of Cambodia to the machetes of Rwanda to the ongoing nightmare in Darfur. Gareth Evans, president of the International Crisis Group, explains this lack of government action. In a more hopeful vein, however, he also shows how the emergence of a new international norm can protect the peoples of the world from mass crimes.
The Responsibility to Protect (or R2P) concept was born in 2001 and embraced at the UN World Summit in 2005. The heart of this new international norm is the belief that if sovereign governments fail to protect their own people from genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other major crimes against humanity, then the wider international community must take whatever action is appropriate. The new norm emphasizes assistance and prevention, not coercion, but it also accepts that it is sometimes right to fight. The bottom line is that the world cannot just stand by.
“Never again” is still more a hope than a promise, however. The 2005 consensus remains politically fragile, with many developing states worrying that R2P goes too far or is too easily capable of misuse by major powers. Political will must be solidified, and effective institutional capacity must be created. This important book meets these challenges head on, clarifying misunderstandings about the new norm’s scope and limits and spelling out the steps needed to make R2P work in practice.
Evans shows how Responsibility to Protect is far better equipped to end mass atrocity crimes than is “the right to intervene” or any other “humanitarian intervention” doctrine of the past. The book is enlivened throughout by real-world examples, analyses of current events, and assessments drawn from the author’s own vast experience.
How, if at all, do governments influence the choices that international judges make? This question has justly received ample attention in the literature. Unlike in the study of U.S. judicial politics, however, relatively few of these scholarly efforts have been devoted to the question of how governments use the appointment process to shape the international judiciary. This article evaluates what we know about the politics of international judicial appointments and identifies some areas for future research. International judges are much more diverse in their backgrounds and preferences than is commonly assumed. To some, the prototypical international judge is a committed professional with exceptional moral standards who cares deeply about the advancement of international law and is largely unresponsive to material incentives or political pressures. To others, international judges are more like diplomats who use legal reasoning as a mere guise for making decisions that fit the national interests of the governments that appointed them. Empirical research appears to show that the international judiciary contains examples of both these ideal types as well as many others. More interestingly, this research suggests that this variation can be understood reasonably well by examining the motivations of governments and the institutional details of the appointment process.
The latest issue of the American Review of International Arbitration (Vol. 17, no. 4, 2006) is out. Contents include:
The latest issue of the Journal of World Trade (Vol. 42, no. 4, August 2008) is out. Contents include:
