Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) are blockchain-based entities that operate without centralized management or shareholders, enabling worldwide token holders the option of participating in their governance through self-executing smart contracts. With approximately fifty thousand DAOs controlling over $30 billion in assets, these organizations offer unprecedented efficiency and global collaboration, enabling stakeholders to participate and contribute to the operation of DAOs regardless of their jurisdiction or physical presence. DAOs, however, also present significant legal and regulatory challenges, particularly concerning liability, contractual enforcement, tax obligations, and oversight. Their decentralized and fluid structure makes it substantively difficult for any single country—including powerful actors such as the United States and the European Union—to assert jurisdiction or exercise regulatory authority over such organizations. In addition to governance considerations, the decentralized, pseudonymous, and borderless structure of DAOs may be exploited for unlawful purposes, most notably money laundering.
This Article examines how DAOs, particularly within the decentralized finance sector, facilitate anonymous cross-border transactions that pose novel and significant money laundering risks. By analyzing existing regulatory responses in major jurisdictions including the United States and the European Union, as well as efforts by key international organizations such as the Financial Action Task Force, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations, the Article demonstrates that prevailing regulatory frameworks and enforcement models cannot adequately respond to the distinct challenges presented by DAOs. This regulatory vacuum poses significant risks to global financial stability, the integrity of the financial systems, and core national-security interests, including the prevention of sanctions evasion, counterterrorism and proliferation financing, and the deduction and disruption of state-sponsored, cyber-enabled illicit finance. Accordingly, the Article proposes a novel, modular, risk-based, global anti-money laundering framework tailored to DAOs’ unique operational realities. The proposed framework aligns with principles of functional equivalence, technological neutrality, and transnational cooperation, offering a more effective means of addressing DAO-related, anti-money laundering risks while preserving space for innovation.
Sunday, June 14, 2026
Volovelsky & Agon: Decentralized Autonomous Organizations and the Anti-Money Laundering Challenge: Rethinking Global Frameworks for a Leaderless World
Friday, July 5, 2024
Koh: The National Security Constitution in the Twenty-First Century
Since the beginning of the American Republic, a package of norms has evolved in the U.S. Constitution to protect the operation of checks and balances in national security policy. This “National Security Constitution” promotes shared powers and balanced institutional participation in foreign policymaking. Today it is under attack from a competing claim of executive unilateralism generated by recurrent patterns of presidential activism, congressional passivity, and judicial tolerance. This dynamic has pushed presidents of both parties to press the limits of law in foreign affairs.
In his award-winning National Security Constitution (1990), Harold Hongju Koh traced the evolution of this constitutional struggle across America’s history. This new book, based on the earlier volume but with roughly 70 percent new material, brings the story to the present, placing recent events into constitutional perspective. Reviewing the presidencies of the twenty-first century, he explains why modern national security threats have given presidents of both parties incentives to monopolize foreign policy decision-making, Congress incentives to defer, and the courts reasons to rubber-stamp. Koh suggests both a workable strategy and crucial prescriptions to restore the balance of our constitutional order in addressing modern global crises.
Wednesday, September 5, 2018
Proulx: Counterterrorism and National Security: The Domestic/International Law Interface
In this chapter, I explore the relationship between international law and domestic legal systems in the counterterrorism area, with a particular focus on the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC’s) promulgation of relevant legal obligations. The chapter critically examines some ways in which international criminal law may accommodate ‘terrorism’, along with its more important shortcomings in doing so, and canvasses key developments regarding States’ counterterrorism obligations since 9/11. Then, I investigate the viability of expanding the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction to encompass ‘crimes’ of ‘terrorism’, along with the prospect of UNSC referrals to that court involving terrorism-related cases. In critically analysing ground-breaking UNSC resolutions imposing wide-ranging counterterrorism duties on States, I shed light on that organ’s ‘quasi-legislative’ exercise of its powers and the implications for the implementation of those obligations in domestic law. Building on this foundation, the chapter briefly turns to an analysis of how these duties are implemented and enforced in domestic settings, with emphasis on Australia, Canada, and Singapore. My ambition is to show that international counterterrorism obligations remain painstakingly dependent on States’ national security policies. Ultimately, I argue that it might be more helpful to embrace a broader conception of international criminal law, as an effective global counterterrorism campaign can only be pursued meaningfully through what I term a ‘transnational network of criminal and civil law’.
Thursday, November 2, 2017
Workshop: The Interface of National Security and Humanitarian Law
The Interface of National Security and Humanitarian Law in Situations of Low-Intensity Armed Conflict / High Intensity Emergency
Situations of low-intensity internal conflict pose enormous challenges to the international legal and political community, as the types and complexity of internal armed conflict have proliferated in the post-Cold War and 9/11 eras. In parallel, serious challenges to democratic states from violent political challengers continue to manifest and have resulted in extensive reliance on national security and counter terrorism regimes.
This workshop is uniquely positioned to explore the overlap between situations of armed conflict to which the LIAC is applicable and situations of emergency in which it is generally assumed that human rights norms primarily apply, with modifications of derogation and other accommodations as demanded by the exigencies of the situation. Given the unique history of Northern Ireland with vigorous debates as to the applicability of IHL during the recent conflict there is much relevant learning to contemporary situations of protracted violence (including Mexico and Colombia) where the overlap between IHL and human rights norms remains contested.
Monday, March 28, 2016
Call for Papers: Revisiting the Role of International Law in National Security
CALL FOR PAPERS: REVISITING THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL SECURITYMany conversations in the U.S. about situations of armed conflict – within civil society, academia, and the U.S. government – center on “national security law,” often drawing primarily from domestic law and military perspectives. International law is sometimes set aside in these discussions. This workshop aims to draw the international legal aspects of armed conflicts to the forefront once again.
This workshop, co-organized by the International Committee of the Red Cross’s Delegation in Washington, and faculty at Loyola Law School Los Angeles, Stanford Law School, and Cardozo School of Law, is for public international law scholars and practitioners. It aims to drive discussions of public international law, including international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international criminal law, into conversations, in the U.S. in particular, on national security issues and situations of armed conflict.
The workshop will provide time to discuss scholarly articles that are in process, as well as other major issues of international legal concern regarding situations of armed conflict. Following discussions, the group of participants may choose to collaborate on an outcome document.
We invite you to submit an abstract or draft of an article for discussion. A small number of papers will be selected for discussion at the workshop. The article does not need to be finished – an abstract or draft may be submitted.
When: May 19th, 2016 (full day)
Where: Cardozo Law School, New York City
Submissions: Please send your name, current affiliation, and paper proposal to Tracey Begley, trbegley@icrc.org.
Deadline for submissions: April 8, 2016
A limited amount of travel funds may be available.
Hosted by Cardozo Law School; Co-organized by the International Committee of the Red Cross Delegation for the United States and Canada, and faculty at Loyola Law School Los Angeles and Stanford Law School.
Thursday, December 10, 2015
Special Issue: Sustainable Energy Investments and National Security: Arbitration and Negotiation Issues
- Special Issue: Sustainable Energy Investments and National Security: Arbitration and Negotiation Issues
- Paolo Davide Farah, Sustainable energy investments and national security: arbitration and negotiation issues
- Fernando Dias Simões, Powered by expertise: selecting arbitrators in energy disputes
- Jun Xiao, How can a prospective China–EU BIT contribute to sustainable investment: in light of the UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development
- Qinglin Zhang, Analysis of the impact on sustainable development by investment regulations in the Energy Charter Treaty
- Paolo Davide Farah & Riccardo Tremolada, Offshore natural gas resources in the eastern Mediterranean in relation to the European Union: a legal perspective through the lenses of MedReg
- Haifeng Deng, Paolo Davide Farah, & Anna Wang, China’s role and contribution in the global governance of climate change: institutional adjustments for carbon tax introduction, collection and management in China
Monday, January 6, 2014
Call for Papers: Governing Intelligence: Transnational Threats and the National Security State
Governing Intelligence
Transnational Threats and the National Security State
May 2, 2014 at Stanford Law School
Introduction
As the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 Commission Report approaches, the recurring dispute over the boundaries of the post-9/11 national security state is once again in full swing. In the United States, legislators, academics, and commentators have put forward various proposals to rein in intelligence gathering ranging from increased transparency in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to enhanced oversight of the Intelligence Community. As a result, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, has pledged to conduct a “total review” of all intelligence programs.
The goal of Governing Intelligence is to move beyond the rather narrow focus of today's debate -- largely about surveillance -- to have a much broader conversation about the power and limits of intelligence agencies. We will convene academics, policymakers, business leaders, and civil society groups to analyze the challenges of intelligence governance from a comparative and international perspective. The premise behind the symposium is that the debate to rein in intelligence gathering should occur along with an examination of the power and limits of intelligence agencies in the face of transnational threats such as terrorism, cyber-warfare, drug trafficking, and weapons proliferation. Only then will we appreciate the imperatives of freedom and security in their proper context.
Call for Papers
The Stanford Journal of International Law seeks contributions by academics, practitioners, and policymakers in the form of approx. 10-15,000-word scholarly essays or 5,000-word white papers on either of the following topics: (a) national intelligence and transnational threats; or, (b) individual rights and intelligence gathering. The following is a non-exhaustive list of sub-topics and questions meant to provide guidance on the kinds of submissions we are looking for. Preference will be given to interdisciplinary submissions and submissions that combine descriptive and normative analyses.
National Intelligence and Transnational Threats:
1. Domestic Legal Mandates and Organizational Design: What is the relationship between organizational design and an intelligence system’s ability to counter transnational threats? To what extent should the legal mandates of particular intelligence agencies be reworked in the face of transnational threats? How do states compare in this regard? Can best practices be identified?
2. Intelligence Sharing and Transnational Threats: What role does intelligence sharing play in countering transnational threats? What are the strengths and weaknesses of bilateral or multilateral intelligence sharing agreements? To what extent should international organizations engage in intelligence gathering and sharing to counter transnational threats?
Individual Rights and Intelligence Gathering:
1. Domestic Safeguards and Oversight Mechanisms: How do oversight and accountability systems compare in ensuring the protection of individual rights vis-à-vis intelligence gathering? Do technology-enabled enhancements in intelligence gathering and law enforcement such as data mining and biometrics call for the strengthening of safeguards to protect individual rights? Can best practices be identified?
2. Extraterritorial Intelligence Gathering and Human Rights: What is the scope of a right to privacy, if any, under international law? Who is bound by such international law norms? Is there a need for the development of additional international law rules or instruments to address the changing intelligence gathering capabilities of states?
Submissions Mechanics and Timeline
Please send a 1-2 page abstract of your essay or white paper in Word format, a C.V. of the author(s), and point of contact information to sjilboard@gmail.com by 5:00PM PST on February 1, 2014.
Decisions will be made on a rolling basis and released no later than by February 15, 2014. Shortlisted authors will be invited to make a panel presentation based on their working paper at the journal’s Symposium on May 2, 2014. Although acceptance of the invitation is not required to receive an offer of publication, priority will be given to shortlisted authors who accept the invitation to present at the Symposium. In the case of presenters, a draft presentation paper will be due by April 25, 2014.
Final drafts of approx. 10-15,000-word scholarly essays or 5,000-word white papers must be submitted for publication by August 15, 2014. Subject to customary editorial standards, the selected contributions will be published in Issue 51.1 of the Stanford Journal of International Law, which is scheduled for publication in January 2015.
Please address any questions you may have about the Call for Papers to José Alemán, Editor-in-Chief, at jaleman1@stanford.edu.
Travel and Accommodation Expenses
We anticipate paying reasonable round-trip domestic coach airfare and providing hotel accommodation for presenters.
Thursday, August 30, 2012
Chesney: Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism
By the end of the first post-9/11 decade, the legal architecture associated with the U.S. government’s use of military detention and lethal force in the counterterrorism setting had come to seem relatively stable, supported by a remarkable degree of cross-branch and cross-party consensus (manifested by legislation, judicial decisions, and consistency of policy across two very different presidential administrations). That stability is certain to collapse during the second post-9/11 decade, however, thanks to the rapid erosion of two factors that have played a critical role in generating the recent appearance of consensus: the existence of an undisputed armed conflict in Afghanistan as to which the law of armed conflict clearly applies, and the existence of a relatively-identifiable enemy in the form of the original al Qaeda organization.
Several long-term trends contribute to the erosion of these stabilizing factors. Most obviously, the overt phase of the war in Afghanistan is ending. At the same time, the U.S. government for a host of reasons places ever more emphasis on what we might call the “shadow war” model (i.e., the use of low-visibility or even deniable means to capture, disrupt, or kill terrorism-related targets in an array of locations around the world). The original Al Qaeda organization, meanwhile, is undergoing an extraordinary process of simultaneous decimation, diffusion, and fragmentation, one upshot of which has been the proliferation of loosely-related regional groups that have varying degrees of connection to the remaining core al Qaeda leadership.
These shifts in the strategic posture of both the United States and al Qaeda profoundly disrupt the stability of the current legal architecture upon which military detention and lethal force rest. Specifically, they make it far more difficult (though not impossible) to establish the relevance of the law of armed conflict to U.S. counterterrorism activities, and they raise exceedingly difficult questions regarding just whom these activities lawfully may be directed against. Critically, they also all but guarantee that a new wave of judicial intervention to consider just those questions will occur. Bearing that in mind, I conclude the paper by outlining steps that could be taken now to better align the legal architecture with the trends described above.
Monday, January 23, 2012
Call for Papers: National Security and Criminal Justice
The Sixth Annual Joint Conference of Ono Academic College and Columbia University, June 5-6, 2012
National Security and Criminal Justice
The School of Law at Ono Academic College invites submissions for the Sixth Annual Joint Conference of Ono Academic College and Columbia University, which will take place on June 5-6, 2012, in Kiryat Ono, Israel.
This year's conference will examine questions at the intersection of national security and criminal justice, through comparative and international perspectives. In particular, we would like to examine the following topics:
Special Courts and Tribunals:
Special "national security" courts were always in existence, and still exist today in many countries. The goal of the conference in this context is to provide a comparative overview of such special tribunals in western democracies. What current justifications are brought for establishing and using such courts? How are such courts comprised? What is the nature of the criminal procedure in these courts? How are the defendants' due process rights ensured? What is the quality of the legal representation afforded to defendants, and how much does international law come into play in the decisions of these courts?
Special Rules and Procedures Applied in Regular Courts:
In some instances, suspected terrorists and defendants tried for national security offences are tried in regular state courts. The conference will explore, with regard to these instances, the special rules and procedures applied in such instances, including any procedural and substantive differences between national security cases and "regular" criminal cases, the special challenges faced by attorneys representing such defendants and the implications of classifying offences as security offences.
The Role of International Law:
In an era of global terrorism, international cooperation in fighting terrorism is viewed as inevitable, and international law has been enlisted to facilitate cooperation and thus strengthen states' national security. International criminal law, on the other hand, is viewed by some as preventing state officials from employing measures used in the past due to fears of being subject to future prosecution. The conference would like to explore the interrelationship between national security and international law and to examine the ways international law can be employed to strengthen national security as well as the ways in which it limits states' actions in fighting security threats.
Candidates interested in participating in the conference are invited to submit abstracts of up to 500 words, along with a brief cv, to Tamar Hostovsky Brandes (tamar_brandes[at]ono.ac.il) by February 30, 2012. Participants will be responsible for their own travel and accommodation expenses.
Thursday, January 20, 2011
Klein: Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea
Natalie Klein (Macquarie Univ. - Law) has published Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (Oxford Univ. Press 2011). Here's the abstract:Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea examines the rights and duties of states across a broad spectrum of maritime security threats. It provides comprehensive coverage of the different dimensions of maritime security in order to assess how responses to maritime security concerns are and should be shaping the law of the sea. The discussion sets out the rules regulating passage of military vessels and military activities at sea, law enforcement activities across the different maritime zones, information sharing and intelligence gathering, as well as armed conflict and naval warfare. In doing so, this book not only addresses traditional security concerns for naval power but also examines responses to contemporary maritime security threats, such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, piracy, drug-trafficking, environmental damage and illegal fishing.
While the protection of sovereignty and national interests remain fundamental to maritime security and the law of the sea, there is increasing acceptance of a common interest that exists among states when seeking to respond to a variety of modern maritime security threats. This book argues that security interests should be given greater scope in our understanding of the law of the sea in light of the changing dynamics of exclusive and inclusive claims to ocean use. More flexibility may be required in the interpretation and application of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea if appropriate responses to ensure maritime security are to be allowed.
Wednesday, December 15, 2010
Chesney: Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens
We lack consensus regarding who lawfully may be held in military custody in the contexts that matter most to U.S. national security today—i.e., counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. More to the point, federal judges lack consensus on this question. They have grappled with it periodically since 2002, and for the past three years have dealt with it continually in connection with the flood of habeas corpus litigation arising out of Guantanamo in the aftermath of the Supreme Court‘s 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush. Unfortunately, the resulting detention jurisprudence is shot through with disagreement on points large and small, leaving the precise boundaries of the government‘s detention authority unclear.
Part I opens with an abstract typology of criteria and constraints that might be used to define a detention standard at the individual level. Part II then provides further context with a thumbnail sketch of two overarching disagreements that greatly complicate the detention debate: we do not agree as to which bodies of law govern this question, nor do we agree as to what each particular body of law actually has to say, if anything, regarding individualized detention criteria even if that body is applicable. Part III follows with a survey of about two dozen habeas decisions between 2002 and 2010 in which courts grapple with the individualized-scope issue, using the typology from Part I as a device to facilitate comparison of the decisions.
With respect to affirmative predicates for detention, the survey concludes that something close to consensus has emerged regarding the use of group membership as a sufficient condition for detention, but that there may yet be considerable disagreement as to what counts as membership in this context. The survey also notes that the jury remains out with respect to whether non-member support for certain groups may also function as a sufficient condition for detention. With respect to variables that can function as constraints on detention authority, the survey shows that the courts have developed consensus against employing certain constraints (such as forbidding the use of detention as to citizens, or in circumstances where the government might have a criminal prosecution alternative). On the other hand, the question of geographic constraints on the scope of detention authority remains unsettled.
Part IV considers the ramifications of this descriptive account. I open by arguing that the lingering uncertainty matters a great deal both in terms of the remaining Guantanamo cases and in terms of other military activities that take place in the shadow of the habeas caselaw. I then consider the arguments for and against legislation to reduce the uncertainty, finding that the case for legislation is difficult but ultimately persuasive in the abstract (note that this paper is not a pitch for adopting some particular legislative proposal). Finally, I explain that the detention litigation illustrates three larger phenomena: (i) the dynamic relationship between law and strategic context; (ii) the increasing significance of domestic courts for purposes of developing international humanitarian law, and (iii) the increasing extent to which domestic law challenges both international humanitarian law and international human rights law for primacy when it comes to the legal regulation of national security-related activities.
Friday, August 20, 2010
Vladeck: The Laws of War as a Constitutional Limit on Military Jurisdiction
Nine years, one Supreme Court decision, two statutes, and a veritable mountain of popular and academic discourse after President Bush's November 2001 Executive Order creating military commissions to try non-citizen terrorism suspects, we have made shockingly little progress in resolving the myriad constitutional questions that such tribunals raise. What’s more, these questions have only become that much more pressing over time, (1) as Congress has stepped in to provide the authorization that the Supreme Court in Hamdan found to be lacking (thereby squarely raising some of the underlying constitutional questions); (2) as the debate over whether civilian courts or military tribunals are a more appropriate forum for trying the so-called “9/11 defendants” has raged both in public circles and behind the scenes within the current Administration; (3) as the nominal defendants before the military commissions have languished in various states of legal limbo; and (4) most recently, as the Supreme Court has upheld Congress’s power to broadly prohibit the provision of “material support” to designated foreign terrorist organizations, an offense that Congress has also made triable before a military commission.
To put it succinctly, it is impossible to have a meaningful debate over whether civilian courts or military commissions are a more appropriate forum for trying terrorism suspects so long as serious questions remain over whether the commissions may constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over particular offenses and/or offenders. And yet, although a number of defendants have attempted to challenge the jurisdiction of the military commissions - especially under the MCA - none of these cases have managed to produce a decision on the merits from any court higher than the Court for Military Commission Review (CMCR). Instead, the federal courts have generally relied on “abstention” doctrine, holding that challenges to the commissions, including to their jurisdiction, can - and should - be resolved on post-conviction appeal. That’s not to say that the Article III courts won’t have the last word; they may well, yet. But in the interim, the time has long since passed for a careful explication of the issues, the relevant precedents, and the most likely answers.
This article attempts to provide a thorough introduction to - and analysis of - the constitutional limits on the jurisdiction of military commissions. By “jurisdiction,” I mean two distinct types of authority: Jurisdiction over the offense, and jurisdiction over the offender. The former goes to whether the military court has the authority to try the charged offense; the latter goes to whether the military court has the authority to try the charged defendant. And whereas there are some precedents on the scope of these two species of jurisdiction in the context of military commissions, the law is far better settled in the closely analogous context of courts-martial, where similar issues routinely arise.
Drawing on the court-martial decisions for support, this article concludes that the Constitution does meaningfully constrain the ability of Congress to subject particular offenders and offenses to trial by military commission. In particular, under the Supreme Court's own jurisprudence, the Constitution only authorizes the exercise of military jurisdiction over servicemembers or "offenses committed by enemy belligerents against the law of war." And although Congress is entitled to some latitude in giving content to the laws of war, there is simply no question that the constitutionality of the Military Commissions Acts of 2006 and 2009 is not settled by Congress’s self-serving ipse dixit in each statute that all of the offenses are war crimes. Even if Article I tolerates such a naked arrogation of power, the jury-trial protections of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not - and never have.
Thursday, February 5, 2009
Conference: Mounting Tensions and Melting Ice: Exploring the Legal and Political Future of the Arctic
The Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law is sponsoring a symposium this Friday, February 6th, on "Mounting Tensions and Melting Ice: Exploring the Legal and Political Future of the Arctic." There will be panels on the Continental Shelf, the Northwest Passage, and Social, Environmental, and Security Claims and Boundary Disputes. The full program is available here.
Sunday, December 14, 2008
Call for Papers: National Security Law Junior Faculty Workshop
The 2nd annual National Security Law Junior Faculty Workshop will take place in Austin on March 12 and 13, 2009. This event is unique in that it combines discussion of works-in-progress with training in the law of war provided by instructors from the International Committee of the Red Cross and the US Army JAG School. The deadline for submitting a paper or abstract for consideration is January 15th. The full details, including a link to the event announcement, are posted here. Note that you do not have to submit a paper, let alone have your paper selected, in order to attend the event. Questions should be submitted to Bobby Chesney at rchesney@law.utexas.edu.
