The question of why states comply with international law has long been at the forefront of international law and international relations scholarship. The compliance discussion has largely focused on negative incentives for states to comply. We argue that there is another, undertheorized mechanism: rewarding. We provide a typology as well as illustrations of how rewards can be applied. Furthermore, we explore the rationale, the potential, and the limitations of rewarding, drawing on rationalist as well as psychological approaches. Both give ample arguments to make more use of rewarding in international law.
Friday, February 19, 2021
van Aaken & Simsek: Rewarding in International Law
Anne van Aaken (Univ. of Hamburg) & Betül Simsek (Univ. of Hamburg - Institute of Law and Economics) have posted Rewarding in International Law (American Journal of International Law, forthcoming). Here's the abstract: