Kato: Revitalizing the obligatory abstention rule in the UN Security Council: an interpretation of the Proviso in Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter

Akira Kato (Kindai Univ. - Law) has posted Revitalizing the obligatory abstention rule in the UN Security Council: an interpretation of the Proviso in Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter (Journal of Conflict & Security Law, forthcoming). Here's the abstract:

According to the proviso in Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter, members of the UN Security Council, including the permanent members, shall abstain from voting under Chapter VI of the UN Charter if they are parties to a dispute. This obligatory abstention rule has had significant implications in recent years, especially in relation to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Although Russia has deviated from this rule by repeatedly vetoing draft resolutions regarding this matter, only a few demands for implementing the obligatory abstention rule has been voiced within the Council. This is somewhat understandable given the legal difficulties surrounding the obligatory abstention rule, which are responsible for the longstanding non-applications of this rule. In this context, this article explores three legal issues related to the rule in question with the goal of revitalizing obligatory abstention in the Council. First, the prolonged non-application of the obligatory abstention rule has resulted in suspicion among scholars that the rule has fallen into desuetude. Second, it has been argued that if a matter has the character of a ‘situation’ rather than a ‘dispute’, the obligatory abstention rule cannot be applied. Third, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the definition of a ‘dispute’ under Article 27 (3) and the method for determining who are considered parties to a dispute. This article mainly asserts that the obligatory abstention rule is still legally valid and that a draft resolution could serve as the basis for determining who the parties to a dispute are.