Calls to define ‘terrorism’ as a legal concept arose in the context of efforts to extradite ‘political offenders’ from the 1930s onwards, with many efforts, over 80 years to the present, to define, criminalize, and depoliticise a common global concept of ‘terrorism’. Those international efforts remain largely unsuccessful to this day. After the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001 (‘9/11’), many states enacted ‘terrorism’ offences, spurred on by the perceived threat of global religious terrorism, obligations imposed by the UN Security Council, gaps in existing criminal liabilities and police powers, and the expressive function of stigmatising terrorism as a special kind of violence against public interests. National laws remain, however, startlingly diverse and there is still a global divergence. At the international level, there is certainly a basic legal consensus that terrorism is criminal violence intended to intimidate a population or coerce a government or international organisation; some national laws add an ulterior intention to pursue a political, religious or ideological cause. There remain intense moral and political disagreements, however, on whether there should be exceptions for just causes (such as liberation violence and rebellion), armed conflicts, and state violence. As a result, a conceptual impasse continues, even if agreement has been edging closer.
Friday, September 25, 2015
Saul: Defining Terrorism: A Conceptual Minefield
Ben Saul (Univ. of Sydney - Law) has posted Defining Terrorism: A Conceptual Minefield (in The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism, A. Gofas, R. English, S.N. Kalyvas, & E. Chenoweth eds., forthcoming). Here's the abstract: