- Patricia Wouters, Foreword: A New Generation of Local Water Leaders
- A. Dan Tarlock & Patricia Wouters, Are Shared Benefits of International Waters an Equitable Apportionment?
- Gabriel E. Eckstein, Commentary on the U.N. International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers
- Alistair S. Rieu-Clarke, An Overview of Stakeholder Participation - What Current Practice and Future Challenges? Case Study of the Danube Basin
- Keith Hayward, Supporting Basin-Wide Reforms with an Independent Assessment Applying International Water Law: Case Study of the Dnieper River
Saturday, October 6, 2007
Friday, October 5, 2007
Is the application of treaty standards producing common principles of investment arbitration? Are arbitral decisions striking an equitable balance between the competing interests involved?This one-day symposium will provide a critical appraisal of arbitral tribunals’ application of the substantive standards enshrined in investment treaties.
- Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights
- David H. Bearce & Stacy Bondanella, Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence
- Marc L. Busch, Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade
- Joseph Jupille & David Leblang, Voting for Change: Calculation, Community, and Euro Referendums
- Pablo Beramendi, Inequality and the Territorial Fragmentation of Solidarity
- Michael Tomz, Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach
This article documents the rise of nonconsensual international lawmaking and analyzes its consequences for the treaty design, treaty participation, and treaty adherence decisions of nation states. Grounding treaties on formal consent has numerous advantages for a decentralized and largely anarchic international legal system that suffers from a pervasive "compliance deficit." But consent also has significant costs, including the inability to ensure that all nations affected by transborder cooperation problems join treaties that seek to resolve those problems. This "participation deficit" helps to explain why international organizations, international tribunals, and sub-groups of states sometimes create legal rules that bind countries without their acceptance or approval. Such rules have wide applicability. But they also can significantly increase sovereignty costs, exacerbating the compliance deficit.
Nonconsensual international lawmaking thus appears to create an insoluble tradeoff between increasing participation and decreasing compliance. This article explains that such a tradeoff is not inevitable. Drawing on recent examples from multilateral efforts to prevent transnational terrorism, preserve the global environment, and protect human rights, the article demonstrates that the game-theoretic structure of certain cooperation problems, together with their institutional and political context, create self-enforcing equilibria in which compliance by all states is a dominant strategy. In these situations, nonconsensual lawmaking reduces both the participation deficit and the compliance deficit. In other issue areas, by contrast, problem structure and context do not alter preexisting incentives to defect and the tradeoff between the two deficits remains unaltered. Analyzing the differences among these issue areas helps to identify the conditions under which nonconsensual lawmaking increases the welfare of all states.
Thursday, October 4, 2007
- Hans Vest, A Structure-Based Concept of Genocidal Intent
- Danilo Zolo, Who is Afraid of Punishing Aggressors?: On the Double-Track Approach to International Criminal Justice
- Joanna Kyriakakis, Australian Prosecution of Corporations for International Crimes: The Potential of the Commonwealth Criminal Code
- Symposium: The ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia: A Missed Opportunity?
- Paola Gaeta, Foreword
- Marina Spinedi, On the Non-Attribution of the Bosnian Serbs' Conduct to Serbia
- Andrew B. Loewenstein & Stephen A. Kostas, Divergent Approaches to Determining Responsibility for Genocide: The Darfur Commission of Inquiry and the ICJ's Judgment in the Genocide Case
- Orna Ben-Naftali & Miri Sharon, What the ICJ did not say about the Duty to Punish Genocide: The Missing Pieces in a Puzzle
- Antonio Cassese, On the Use of Criminal Law Notions in Determining State Responsibility for Genocide
- Andrea Gattini, Evidentiary Issues in the ICJ's Genocide Judgment
- Christian Tomuschat, Reparation in Cases of Genocide
- Symposium: The Principle of Individual Criminal Liability: A Conceptual Framework
- Stefano Manacorda, Foreword
- O. Sara Liwerant, Mass Murder: Discussing Criminological Perspectives
- Vincenzo Militello, The Personal Nature of Individual Criminal Responsibility and the ICC Statute
- Gerhard Werle, Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute
- Markus D. Dubber, Criminalizing Complicity: A Comparative Analysis
- Antonio Cassese, Foreword
- I. The General Principles of International Criminal Law
- Paul J.A. Ritter von Feuerbach, The Foundations of Criminal Law and the Nullum Crimen Principle
- Franz von Liszt, The Rationale for the Nullum Crimen Principle
- II. Challenging International Criminal Justice
- Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, On the Aborted Decision to Bring the German Emperor to Trial
- Benedetto Croce, Against International Post-War Tribunals
The latest issue of the American Journal of Political Science (Vol. 51, no. 4, October 2007) is out. Contents include:
- Sarah M. Brooks & Marcus J. Kurtz, Capital, Trade, and the Political Economies of Reform
- Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & Paul R. Hensel, International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements
- Mark Fey & Kristopher W. Ramsay, Mutual Optimism and War
- Bahar Leventolu & Branislav L. Slantchev, The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War
- Scott Wolford, The Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International Conflict
Previous scholars have argued that international treaties can increase investment by serving as a bond to clarify rules regarding investment, but the empirical literature often fails to find an effect of treaties on investment. In this paper I develop a formal model of bonding and investment, and use an experiment to test the model's internal validity. In the experiment subjects choose how much to invest in another person who has made a prior decision about whether or not to purchase a bond. I find that the option to purchase a bond has multiple effects on investment. First, players purchasing a bond can induce greater investment, but only if the bond is large. Second, if the second actor does not purchase a bond there is a significant decrease in investment relative to the control condition. Third, the first player is more likely to behave consistent with game theoretic equilibrium as the size of the bond increases. One implication of these results is that the inability to find empirical evidence for international treaties' effectiveness may occur because many treaties do not impose bonding costs that are sufficient to induce greater investment.
This Essay considers how cities' climate advocacy fits into regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and impacts. In particular, it integrates Janet Levit's exploration of bottom-up lawmaking with Hari Osofsky's work on law and geography to examine the role of cities in transnational environmental networks. Using the examples of Tulsa and Portland, the piece considers the scale of U.S. cities' involvement in the problem of climate change and the implications of these efforts for climate policy. It argues that a "bottom-up networking" approach to understanding these municipal initiatives illuminates a richer version of their regulatory role critical to making progress on this pressing problem.
Workshop: Turner on "Defense Perspectives on the Tension Between Politics and Law in International Criminal Trials"
Wednesday, October 3, 2007
Tuesday, October 2, 2007
- Albie Sachs, Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights
- Anthony Clark Arend, Who's Afraid of the Geneva Conventions? Treaty Interpretation in the Wake of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
- Edward C. Harris, Personal Data Privacy Tradeoffs and How a Swedish Church Lady, Austrian Public Radio Employees, and Transatlantic Air Carriers Show That Europe Does Not Have the Answers
Monday, October 1, 2007
Dunoff: Dysfunction, Diversion and the Debate Over Preferences: (How) Do Preferential Trade Policies Work?
Should the trade regime provide differential treatment to developing states? Or are uniform, nondiscriminatory rules more appropriate? Twenty years ago, in Developing Countries in the GATT System, Robert Hudec used political economy arguments to claim that preferential trade policies harmed developing states. This essay, part of a volume marking publication of a new edition of Developing Countries, argues that Hudec's claims are necessarily limited by the methodological approaches he used, the theory of trade politics he adopted, and the ontology of the international system that he drew upon. The paper examines Hudec's arguments in light of subsequent scholarship on preferences that uses other methodologies, particularly econometrics. Thus, the paper seeks to examine what we know about preferences, and how we know it. Moreover, in juxtaposing different methodological approaches, the paper suggests a progressive research agenda designed to enhance our understanding of how preferences work and, in particular, their effects on developing states.
This work aims to present the essential elements of international environmental law. The book provides a general overview of why and how the international system elaborates environmental obligations and monitors compliance with them. Second, it discusses the relationship between international obligations and national and local law, with particular reference to federal systems. It indicates another interrelationship, pointing out the influence national law has on the emergence of international law as well as the growing role international norms play in the development and enforcement of national and local environmental policies. Finally, it examines the extent to which environmental protection should be and is taken into account in other regulatory frameworks, from trade law and human rights to disarmament and refugee policy. The basic knowledge provided in this book should allow the reader to undertake further research on topics of environmental regulation at the international level and to understand the implications of international environmental law for national law and policy. The treaties and other texts mentioned are listed and grouped by topic in an appendix. In addition, a bibliography of further readings, a list of Internet sites, and glossary are provided.
As the global economy expands and develops, corporations and other business entities face new challenges under national and international law. This symposium will examine one of the thorniest emerging issues: What are corporations' responsibilities under international law for their activities at home and abroad? The conference will analyze corporate liability for human rights abuses and other grave breaches of international law.
The symposium’s panels will compare doctrinal and theoretical bases for civil liability for human rights abuses by corporations, paying special attention to the Alien Torts Claims Act in the United States. It will also examine the concepts of "aiding and abetting" and complicity as applied to allegations of corporate human rights abuses and consider legal instruments other than civil liability that might be developed to discourage corporations from engaging in human rights abuses. Such alternative instruments include domestic and international criminal law, the use of disclosure under different regulatory regimes, and the United Nations' Human Rights Norms for Corporations.
- Mamoud Zani, La coordination inter-organisationnelle: l'exemple du B.I.T. et l'O.N.U.
- Mamoud Zani, Vers une protection internationale efficace des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels: la nécessité d'une protocole facultatif au Pacte onusien de 1966 prévoyant un système de plaintes
- André Oraison, Les répercussions du statut international du continent Antarctique sur le statut interne des Terres australes etantarctiques françaises
Sunday, September 30, 2007
- Gary Horlick & Fernando Piérola, WTO Dispute Settlement and Dispute Settlement in the "North-South" Agreements of the Americas: Considerations for Choice of Forum
- Rolf J. Langhammer, Service Trade Liberalization as a Handmaiden of Competitiveness in Manufacturing: An Industrialized or Developing Country Issue?
- Ricardo Guilherme & Raymond Saner, The International Monetary Fund’s Influence on Trade Policies of Low-income Countries: A Valid Undertaking?
- Shawkat Alam, Trade Restrictions Pursuant to Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Developmental Implications for Developing Countries
- Yanning Yu, Circumvention and Anti-circumvention in Anti-dumping Practice: A New Problem in China’s Outbound Trade
- Won-Mog Choi, To Comply or Not to Comply? - Non-implementation Problems in the WTO Dispute Settlement System
- Sangeeta Khorana, Do Trade Preferences Enhance Market Access for Developing Countries’ Agricultural Products? Evidence from Switzerland
- Yong-Shik Lee, The Beginning of Economic Integration Between East Asia and North America? – Forming the Third Largest Free Trade Area Between the United States and the Republic of Korea
- Nicholas Pengelley, Separability Revisited: Arbitration Clauses and Bribery
- Christer Söderlund, Intra-EU BIT Investment Protection and the EC Treaty
- Stephan W. Schill, Do Investment Treaties Chill Unilateral State Regulation to Mitigate Climate Change?
- Mabel I. Egonu, Investor-State Arbitration Under ICSID: A Case for Presumption Against Confidentiality?
- Amokura Kawharu, The Public Policy Ground for Setting Aside and Refusing Enforcement of Arbitral Awards - Comments on the New Zealand Approach
- Stephen Barrett-White & Christopher Kee, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards where the Seat of the Arbitration is Australia - How the Eisenwerk Decision Might Still be a Sleeping Assassin