This paper examines the salient incentives and constraints that the current socio-legal system of arbitration places on arbitrators. In doing so, it mirrors the main steps taken by classical law and economics studies on judicial behaviour. It takes the main types of incentives and constraints identified in these studies and applies them to the behaviour of arbitrators. The rationale of the current study is that arbitrators, like everyone else, are maximisers of their own utility. The pursuit of that maximisation influences how they decide cases. The components of their utility are determinants of their behaviour. If we better comprehend these determinants - what influences and motivates the behaviour of arbitrators - we can better understand arbitration, and the law that applies and should apply to it, and the law created by it.
Thursday, September 18, 2014
Schultz & Kovacs: The Law is What the Arbitrator Had for Breakfast: How Income, Reputation, Justice, and Reprimand Act as Determinants of Arbitrator Behaviour
Thomas Schultz (King's College London – Law) & Robert Kovacs (Univ. of Geneva - Law) have posted The Law is What the Arbitrator Had for Breakfast: How Income, Reputation, Justice, and Reprimand Act as Determinants of Arbitrator Behaviour (in Selected Topics in International Arbitration – Liber Amicorum for the 100th Anniversary of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, J.C. Betancourt ed., forthcoming). Here's the abstract: