In theory, certain forms of remote warfare are ideal for compliance with the principle of distinction. Technologically advanced weaponry, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (also known as UAVs, or drones), are able to conduct precision attacks, eliminating targets with a degree of exactness and surety unmatched by previous technologies such as missiles or bombs. In the realm of cyber-hostilities, precisely engineered software or computer code can target and disable very specific objectives, ensuring that only specific objectives are affected by the attack, leaving other systems untouched. Equally, however, the remoteness of such warfare can make distinction assessments and distinction-compliant targeting a harder task. This chapter therefore examines certain questions that arise regarding the principle of distinction and remote warfare. What impact does the remoteness of these means and methods of warfare have on the principle of distinction? Does the fundamental ‘remoteness’ of these kinds of attacks – drone attacks and cyber-attacks – mean that compliance with the principle of distinction is made easier or harder? That is to say, does the physical removal of the attacker from the immediate or proximate vicinity of the target make respecting the principle of distinction more or less achievable? And if compliance with the principle of distinction is facilitated by these remote means and methods of war, how much of that is due to the ‘remoteness’ of the weapons? Is the remoteness of the drone pilot or the cyber-attacker fundamentally linked to distinction-compliant warfare?
Monday, June 6, 2016
Crawford: The Principle of Distinction and Remote Warfare
Emily Crawford (Univ. of Sydney - Law) has posted The Principle of Distinction and Remote Warfare (in Research Handbook on Remote Warfare, Jens David Ohlin ed., forthcoming). Here's the abstract: