Okowa: Sovereignty Contests and the Protection of Natural Resources in Conflict Zones

Phoebe Okowa (Queen Mary, Univ. of London - Law) has published Sovereignty Contests and the Protection of Natural Resources in Conflict Zones (Current Legal Problems, Vol. 66, pp. 33-73, 2013). Here's the abstract:

This article assesses the extent to which the enforceable framework of public international law regulates the exploitation of natural resources in conflict zones, especially in those situations where the incumbent governments claim to power is contested. The first part of the article is explanatory. It considers why despite the prevalence of civil wars in which natural resources has played a prominent role, the subject matter has been so neglected in mainstream public international law discourse. Thematically, two main sources of this institutional reticence may be identified. First, is the implication of international through doctrine that provided legal justification for some of the worst forms of exploitation during the period of colonisation and the continuing existence of relationships of subordination in international institutions. A second source of reticence is international laws preoccupation with the state as the primary actor. As a result, the activities of insurgent groups and multinational corporations, increasingly significant actors in natural resource exploitation are largely beyond the existing regulatory frameworks. The second part of the article evaluates the emerging regulatory regimes that attempt to circumvent the state-centric mechanisms of public international law by imposing obligations directly on multi-national corporations. The article assesses the efficacy of national initiatives of this kind and the inevitable problems of normative conflict if different states and regions embark on uncoordinated unilateral measures of regulation. The final part of the article assesses the decisions taken by post conflict governments in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia to review or annul resource exploitation agreements concluded during the period of civil war. These decisions, it is suggested, challenge the prevailing theory that a change of government as such does not affect the continuing validity of agreements previously concluded.