When and why do American judges enforce treaties? Today’s dominant theory of treaty enforcement is the doctrine of “self-execution,” which suggests that judicial enforcement of treaties is deduced from the nature of the treaties signed. The theory holds that some treaties are written so as to be directly enforceable, just like a statute, with full domestic effects, while other treaties are written so as to create duties only under international law. Unfortunately, as most scholars recognize, the doctrine is perplexing and of limited predictive value.
This Article, based on a new study of the history and record of treaty enforcement, provides a different theory as to when treaties are actually enforced in American courts. It finds that the question of whether a treaty is “self-executing” is acting as a proxy for questions of institutional deference. A good guide to treaty enforcement across the history of the United States is whether it is Congress, the Executive, or a State accused of breach.
The basic treaty enforcement question is, and has been, whether the alleged act of treaty breach justifies a judicial remedy. Judicial deference to Congressional action with respect to a treaty is to be expected. Conversely, the judiciary will continue to use treaty law to prevent States from putting the United States in violation of its international obligations. As to the Executive, the judiciary should begin to explain why, in terms of deference, it is or is not choosing to enforce a treaty against Executive breach.
Wednesday, May 30, 2007
Wu: Treaties' Domains
Tim Wu (Columbia - Law) has published Treaties' Domains (Va. L. Rev., Vol. 93, no. 3, May 2007). Here's the abstract: