Sykes: The Utility of Appellate Review at the WTO and Its Optimal Structure

Alan Sykes (Stanford Univ. - Law) has posted The Utility of Appellate Review at the WTO and Its Optimal Structure. Here's the abstract:

The impasse over the appointment of new judges to the WTO Appellate Body shows no signs of abating, raising considerable doubt about the future of appellate review in trade disputes. This paper examines the need for appellate review in the WTO, drawing on both the history of the GATT and especially on the economic literature assessing the desirability of appellate review in judicial systems. It argues that the WTO does not present a compelling economic case for a two-stage judicial process. It further argues that if some form of appellate review is to be retained in the WTO, a discretionary “certiorari-like” mechanism is the best option, which dominates alternative proposals such as those for a more deferential standard of review or the elimination of de facto “precedent.”