Of all the strands of international legal theory that exist in contemporary international law scholarship, one might have thought that the cognitive turn would impact positivism the most. In this chapter, however, I want to paint a different picture. The caricature of positivism that many of us hold in our heads – as a theory that is formalist, voluntarist, state-centric, and detached from morals – no longer accords with the prevalent conception of the theory in much of the literature. Instead, I argue that the principal challenge to positivism comes from experimental jurisprudence, a nascent body of literature which shows that the general public fails to recognise a source-based concept of law. This challenges positivists to explain why their view is to be preferred to the so-called ‘folk’ concept of law.
Monday, April 22, 2024
Peat: Positivism and the Cognitive Turn
Daniel Peat (Leiden Univ. - Law) has posted Positivism and the Cognitive Turn (in International Legal Theory and the Cognitive Turn, A. van Aaken & M. Hirsch eds., forthcoming). Here's the abstract: