International law is an underdeveloped branch of legal research: researchers still disagree over the proper understanding of several of its most fundamental issues, and genuinely so. This book helps to explain why. It brings clarity that will no doubt make international legal research more rational, which in turn vouches for a more productive legal discourse.
The author, together with invited contributors, builds an argument around theories of epistemological justification. As chapters contend, in international legal discourse, the construction of knowledge about international law presupposes some notion of an international legal system. International legal discourse accommodates several such notions. Each notion derives from a different conception of law. Thus, depending on whether a researcher endorses a legal positivist’s, a legal idealist’s or a legal realist’s conception of law, he or she will be constructing knowledge of international law under different epistemic conditions. The book sheds considerable light on these different conditions, with several chapters exploring how the different notions of an international legal system play out in the context of a series of concrete themes of legal practice. In doing so, the book helps to build a bridge between the practical and more philosophical aspects of this topic.
