Many international agreements include flexibility devices and risk-management tools that enable states to tailor treaties to an uncertain and changing world. One area where escape clauses have received insufficient scholarly attention is human rights. Several prominent human rights agreements allow states to derogate during periods of crisis. Why do states formally and publicly derogate from human rights agreements? We argue that derogations are a rational response to domestic political uncertainty; they enable governments facing threats at home to buy time and legal breathing space to confront crises while, at the same time, signaling to concerned audiences that deviations from rights protections are temporary. Our conclusions are based on comprehensive new datasets of derogations and states of emergency around the world from 1976 to 2007.
Thursday, June 10, 2010
Helfer, Hafner-Burton, & Fariss: Emergency and Escape: Explaining Why States Derogate from Human Rights Treaties During National Emergencies
Laurence R. Helfer (Duke Univ. - Law), Emilie Marie Hafner-Burton (Univ. of California, San Diego - International Relations) & Christopher J. Fariss (Univ. of California, San Diego) have posted Emergency and Escape: Explaining Why States Derogate from Human Rights Treaties During National Emergencies. Here's the abstract: