Schill & Vidigal: Designing Investment Dispute Settlement À La Carte: Insights from Comparative Institutional Design Analysis

Stephan W. Schill (Univ. of Amsterdam - Law) & Geraldo Vidigal (Univ. of Amsterdam - Law) have posted Designing Investment Dispute Settlement À La Carte: Insights from Comparative Institutional Design Analysis (Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, forthcoming). Here's the abstract:

The multilateral expression of the desire to reform investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) obscures the diverging preferences states have in respect of which future dispute settlement model to adopt. In order to garner broad acceptability, this article proposes that the reformed system could be designed as ‘dispute settlement à la carte’, with a Multilateral Investment Court coexisting with other forms of dispute resolution under the umbrella of one multilateral institution. With a view to showing that such a system is feasible, this article draws on comparative institutional design analysis, that is, a comparative assessment of dispute settlement design features across different international dispute settlement systems. This approach helps to explore what institutional design features are a useful source of inspiration for a future investment dispute settlement system that preserves flexibility for states in the choice of their preferred means of adjudication, while safeguarding legal certainty and promoting coherence in investment dispute settlement.