The principle of noncombatant immunity prohibits warring parties from intentionally targeting noncombatants. I explicate the moral version of this view and its criticisms by reductive individualists; they argue that certain civilians on the unjust side are morally liable to be lethally targeted to forestall substantial contributions to that war. I then argue that reductivists are mistaken in thinking that causally contributing to an unjust war is a necessary condition for moral liability. Certain noncontributing civilians—notably, war-profiteers—can be morally liable to be lethally targeted. Thus, the principle of noncombatant immunity is mistaken as a moral (though not necessarily as a legal) doctrine, not just because some civilians contribute substantially, but because some unjustly enriched civilians culpably fail to discharge their restitutionary duties to those whose victimization made the unjust enrichment possible. Consequently, the moral criterion for lethal liability in war is even broader than reductive individualists have argued.
Monday, March 20, 2017
Bazargan-Forward: Noncombatant Immunity and War-Profiteering
Saba Bazargan-Forward (Univ. of California, San Diego - Philosophy) has posted Noncombatant Immunity and War-Profiteering (in The Oxford Handbook on the Ethics of War, Helen Frowe & Seth Lazar eds., forthcoming). Here's the abstract: