This paper develops a conceptual framework for analyzing orchestration, a mode of governance that is widely used by international organizations (IGOs) and other governance actors, but rarely identified or analyzed. IGOs engage in orchestration when they enlist intermediary actors on a voluntary basis, by providing them with ideational and material support, to address target actors in pursuit of IGO governance goals. Orchestration is thus both indirect (because the IGO acts through intermediaries) and soft (because the IGO lacks control over intermediaries). These features distinguish orchestration from traditional hierarchical governance, which addresses targets directly through hard instruments; from governance through collaboration with targets, which is direct but soft; and from delegation, which is indirect but hard. The paper elaborates the concept of orchestration, identifies patterns and techniques of orchestration, and advances hypotheses regarding the conditions under which governance actors in general and IGOs in particular can be expected to rely on orchestration.
Saturday, August 11, 2012
Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, & Zangl: Orchestration: Global Governance through Intermediaries
Kenneth W. Abbott (Arizona State Univ. - Law), Philipp Genschel (Jacobs Univ. Bremen - Political Science), Duncan Snidal (Univ. of Oxford - International Relations), & Bernhard Zangl (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München - Political Science) have posted Orchestration: Global Governance through Intermediaries. Here's the abstract: